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Food Prices in 2011?Preface
ree years ago Farm Foundation, NFP asked Purdue University economists Wallace Tyner, Philip Abbot and
Christopher Hurt to review the literature and provide a comprehensive assessment of the major factors driving
commodity and food prices. Our objective was to cool the heated rhetoric in the food-versus-fuel debate, which
had been rising right along with the prices of corn and oil.
Today, although the rhetoric seems to be lower, prices of oil and commodities, including corn, soybeans and 
wheat, have again approached the levels of 2008. In addition, policy makers today are focused on a national 
debate over fiscal policy—a debate that encompasses the future direction of food, agricultural and energy policies.
Farm Foundation commissioned the current paper to provide a comprehensive, objective assessment of the forces
driving commodity and food prices. A major question was whether the forces at work today are the same as or 
diﬀerent from those of 2008. Our goal is to provide public and private decision makers with an objective assessment
of the forces driving commodity prices, as well as oﬀer some insights into the impacts on policy options.
Now, as in 2008, the full story behind rapid increases in commodity prices is not a simple one. Many of the 
factors driving prices remain the same but play out in diﬀerent ways—including biofuel demands, exchange rates
and weather. As concluded in 2008, one simple fact stands out: economic growth and rising human aspirations 
are putting ever greater pressure on the global resource base. As with the earlier work, this report does not attempt
to attribute the proportion of the price increases among the diﬀerent drivers. Rather the focus is on understanding
the nature and interactions of the respective factors.
In an environment of higher and more volatile commodity and food prices, as well as budget constraints, policy
makers and society are faced with diﬃcult choices about fundamental elements of food, agricultural and energy
policies. We hope that the information provided in this report will strengthen the ability of all stakeholders to 
address some of the most critical public policy issues facing the world today.
Neilson Conklin
President




We authors are agricultural economists on the faculty at Purdue University. Abbott works in international trade
and macro factors. Hurt works in analysis of commodity markets. Tyner is an energy and policy economist most
recently specializing in biofuels policies. We each brought a unique perspective to the table, and have learned from
each other through many long conversations on the food price topic. We believe the final product reflects the in-
sights gained through working as a multi-specialist team.
is paper was prepared by the authors for Farm Foundation, NFP. We are indebted to Mary ompson for many
useful editing suggestions. Helpful comments from Neil Conklin, Vern Eidman, Derek Headey and Peter Timmer
are greatly appreciated. e authors are solely responsible for the content of this paper.Table of Contents
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iiAgricultural and other commodity prices have increased again
in 2011. Is this a rerun of the 2008 price spikes, or are the
underlying drivers and mechanisms diﬀerent this time around?
Answering this question has been the fundamental objective
of this paper.
We have identified five key issues that are important
elements of the agricultural commodity price story:
• Two big, persistent demand shocks. Biofuels demands, 
particularly for corn, and Chinese soybean imports have
increased in recent years and remain at high levels. 
Both the size and persistence of these shocks aﬀect 
market outcomes.
• Greater market inelasticity. More inelastic agricultural 
markets mean prices are both higher in response to 
demand shocks and are now more volatile. Combined 
eﬀects of diﬀerent components leading to greater 
inelasticity have a bigger impact than each component 
would separately.
• Weather and stocks. Poor harvests due to weather are 
more important in 2011 than in 2008. Price increases 
are now more consistent with low stocks-to-use ratios.
• Chinese policy. Chinese trade and stocks policies, 
which vary across commodities, are critical factors 
conditioning the impact of income growth and dietary 
transition on world market outcomes. It is necessary to 
understand Chinese self-suﬃciency to interpret world 
supply-utilization and stocks data. Being nearly self-
suﬃcient in grains, the Chinese are largely disconnected
from those world markets. at is not the case in 
soybeans, since the Chinese import most of their 
soybean requirements.
• Macroeconomic factors. While changes are not so 
dramatic in 2011, the dollar exchange rate remains 
weak and volatile. e exchange rate is also correlated 
with other macroeconomic factors—including 
worldwide economic growth—that influence the 
expected high level of agricultural commodity prices 
even if there are not production shortfalls.
Key lessons behind current commodity market events cut
across these five issues. While we used these five issues to
organize analysis in the paper, we highlight those key 
lessons here:
• Biofuels policy has brought about a large, persistent 
and non-price responsive demand for corn. e 
combination of mandates and blending limitations—
the blend wall—set by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) regulations determine the 
corn demand for ethanol, regardless of the corn price. 
It took 27% of the 2010-11 corn crop to meet the 
demand for corn to produce ethanol, compared to 10% 
of the 2005-2006 crop. (Both numbers are adjusted for 
by-products used as feed.) Ethanol from corn has nearly 
reached the maximum mandated level, so while this 
demand will persist, it should not continue to expand.
• Income growth and dietary improvement have driven 
rapid growth in Chinese soybean imports, but stocks-
building contributed to the surge in imports in the last 
three years. Stocks-building accounted for nearly 40% 
of the increase in Chinese soybean imports since 2008. 
China went from holding a very small stock of soybeans 
to an expected 23% stocks-to-use ratio in 2011. Given 
that level of stocks, it is expected that future import and 
demand increases will follow income growth, as they 
did prior to 2008. 
• Land adjustments highlight why the two demand 
shocks are important, and why those shocks have spilled 
over to other commodities. Globally, the flexibility to 
expand area for high demand crops was composed of 
about 70% new area, and 30% displacing alternative 
crops. In the United States, where land area has been 
fairly stable, the new demands caused land to be 
reallocated away from other crops. e simplest way to 
express these demand drivers is to measure the change 
in acreage required to satisfy biofuels production and 
U.S. exports of soybeans to China. In 2005, 16.1 
million acres were required to satisfy these two demands 
in the United States. In 2010, it took 46.5 million 
acres—an increase of 189%—to satisfy these two 
demands, or 29% of total U.S. corn and soybean 
harvested acreage. is shift contributed to lower 
production and much higher prices for commodities, 
such as cotton, that did not experience price spikes 
in 2008. Higher prices for other commodities now 
mean less opportunity for land reallocation.
• ese events have played out in very inelastic markets 
due not only to biofuels polices and land reallocation 
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feed demand and tight stocks in some markets. Low 
stocks are an important factor contributing to greater 
inelasticity and signaling higher prices. Since 2008, 
higher feed prices have caused livestock producers and 
market prices for all livestock products—meat, dairy, 
eggs—to adjust, making them better able to weather 
current feed price increases. at means fewer livestock 
production capacity adjustments would be expected 
now and, therefore, more inelastic demand for animal 
feed components, such as corn and soybeans. As world 
prices increased in 2007 and 2008, countries altered 
trade policies to isolate and partially stabilize their 
domestic markets from the eﬀects of high prices. 
While some of the extreme trade policy measures taken 
in 2007-08 have not yet been repeated in the current 
agricultural price run-up, international agricultural 
markets remain thin and volatile.
• Weather is more important this time, however, the big 
weather shocks in wheat and barley have been buﬀered 
by large stocks and past supply increases. Corn stocks 
were drawn down when U.S. yields dropped in 2010. 
Soybean stocks have remained tight as Chinese demand 
has surged. Rice stocks are adequate, so rice prices have 
not increased.
• Price diﬀerences across commodities suggest market 
fundamentals are critical to today’s high prices. Rice 
and wheat prices are not near 2008 peaks, while corn 
and soybeans are.
Implications for the future
Much is riding on 2011-12 corn and soybean production.
A return to normal yields barely allows the world to
continue to meet trend consumption. In the absence of
yields well above trend, it appears the tight world stocks
situation for corn and soybeans cannot be overcome in one
crop year. High prices will exist for two crop years or longer
and then moderate to levels lower than 2011 peaks but
higher than historic norms.
Are we in another boom/bust cycle? Historically, low stocks
due to short periods of demand surge or production
shortfalls have sharply increased prices, leading to a supply
response that brings more land into cultivation. If, after
several years, the demand surge does not persist and supply
is permanently increased, there are long periods of low
prices and narrow farmer margins.
is time, however, the demand surges from biofuels and
Chinese soybean purchases appear to be persistent. While
the demand shifts to date are expected to persist, the rate of
increase in demand growth is expected to slow as corn
biofuels mandates are reached and as China has built
adequate soybeans stocks levels. is slowing of the demand
surges may give world supply a better opportunity to catch
up in coming years. Other events—such as additional
demand growth, the degree of supply response, and
macroeconomic variables—will all be important in
determining how this cycle plays out.
Policy Issues
Biofuels: e United States currently uses both subsidies and
mandates to encourage biofuels production, though the
Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) mandate is currently more
important than the subsidy. One policy question: What
happens if subsidies are reduced or eliminated or the
mandate is changed? Under the most likely circumstances,
changing either policy would have little near-term impact.
Since most of the subsidy today is split between the blender
and the consumer—not the producer—reducing the
subsidy would have little impact on corn demand under
most circumstances. Reducing the RFS would not have
much impact as long as oil prices remain high because the
production capacity already exists. e blend wall now
constrains the impact of high oil prices on corn. Relaxing
blending restrictions could lead to increases in biofuels
demand for corn. If oil prices were lower, the impacts of
subsidy and RFS changes would be significant.
U.S. Agricultural Policy: U.S. agricultural policy has
primarily been a “policy of abundance,” designed to reduce
supply, restrict land use and increase demand to help
increase and stabilize farm incomes. at policy developed
because the United States has generally been blessed with
the ability to produce more than could be consumed at
profitable prices for producers. A shift to a “policy of
shortage” would emphasize programs that stimulate supply
and do not subsidize demand with taxpayer funds or
political mandates.
Trade Policy: For trade liberalization to contribute to more
stable world markets, large traders and large, self-suﬃcient
producing countries need to follow more liberal, open trade
regimes. Importers, as well as exporters, need to participate
in that liberalization.
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International agricultural prices have risen once again, with
some commodity prices equal to or exceeding peaks seen in
2008. Figure 1, which shows monthly price indices from
2000 until May 2011, illustrates the recent evolution of
prices and oﬀers comparisons to the 2006-2008 food crisis
period. It shows that corn prices have returned to the peak
levels of June 2008. Soybeans have nearly returned to the
2008 peak, while wheat and rice prices are at about 65% of
peak levels with somewhat diﬀerent trajectories. Rice exhibited
the most dramatic price spike in 2008. e price of rice fell
but to levels still higher than in the 2000-2005 period, and
is now slightly lower. Wheat prices fell dramatically after
2008, and have risen sharply in recent months.
Attention is focused on international commodity prices
more broadly now because some agricultural commodity
prices, notably sugar and cotton, have increased well beyond
2008 levels. One consequence is that summary indices, such
as the IMF Food index shown in Figure 2, and similar
indices reported by the FAO and World Bank, have reached
levels achieved in mid-2008. In that earlier food price run-
up, U.S. pork prices lagged increases in feed costs. Today, 
U.S. pork prices are running ahead of feed price increases.
Relative changes in pork and beef prices remain smaller
than changes in feed grain and oilseed prices.
While the dynamics of 2011 commodity prices are diﬀerent
from the 2006-2008 period, similar factors are partially
responsible for the current price increases. In fact, the
current increases may be a continuation of some of the
events and circumstances that contributed to the earlier
price increases. It is useful to first review the various factors
driving the 2008 food price spikes, including those that
remain controversial. ose factors are:
Supply-utilization shocks—weather, production 
shortfalls, low stocks;
ird-world income and population growth and 
resulting dietary transitions;
Long-run production trends and declining investments 
in agricultural research;
Biofuels and the link between corn and crude oil;
Export restrictions and trade policy responses;
Exchange rates and macroeconomic factors; and
Financialization of commodities and speculation.
Introduction
Figure 1: Monthly Agricultural Commodity Prices, 2000-2011
Note: Monthly commodity prices are expressed as an index equal to 1 on average in 2002.  
Source: IMF, 2011Trostle (2008) explained in some detail the various possible
causes of high agricultural prices and provides a timeline
over which these factors matter. Headey and Fan (2010)
reviewed the extensive literature exploring these explanations
and the extent to which disagreement still persists. 
While weather events, such as drought in Russia, are more
important today than in 2008, accumulated stocks have
buﬀered the eﬀects on world wheat prices. Due to adequate
supplies, rice prices are, in fact, below levels realized after
the 2008 spike collapsed. Corn and soybeans are most
strongly aﬀected in the current price run-up. at
commodity-specific stories diﬀer suggests market
fundamentals—not common macroeconomic factors—
dominate this time. e two major drivers in 2011 are big,
persistent demand shocks due to biofuels policies and
demand and Chinese soybean imports. Occurring at the
same time, these drivers have shifted the demand for basic
agricultural products, had a major impact on supply and
demand balances, and are causing major land adjustments.
In the process, global land use has changed significantly.
Market events play out in an economic environment that
leads to more volatile prices as a result of several additional
factors, including trade policy and macroeconomics. 
Our understanding of the drivers of world agricultural
prices focuses on five issues: the persistent demand shocks,
inelasticity in world markets, weather and stocks, Chinese
policy, and macroeconomic factors. e following section
examines each of those issues, as well as the short- and 
long-run consequences of high agricultural prices and
implications for the future, including an assessment of
whether the two key drivers will continue to be so
important. Key policy debates that may aﬀect agriculture
and food security in the future are also considered.
Five Key Issues behind High 
Agricultural Commodity Prices
Issue 1: Big, Persistent Demand Shocks:
Biofuels and Chinese Soybeans
Biofuels
Worldwide there is rapid expansion of corn and vegetable
oil use for fuel. Figure 3 shows how food, seed and
industrial (FSI) use of corn has expanded rapidly in the past
five to seven years. Since the 2005-06 marketing year, 88%
or 115 million metric tons (mmt) of the growth in total
world corn use has been in the FSI category, where ethanol
production is placed.
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Figure 2: Monthly Food and Commodity Prices Indices, 2000-2011
Note: Monthly commodity prices are expressed as an index equal to 1 on average in 2002.  
Source: IMF, 2011While world data does not allow a separation of ethanol
production from other FSI categories, U.S. data does. Since
2005-06, total annual corn usage in the United States has
increased by 2.23 billion bushels (56.6 mmt), and corn
usage for ethanol has increased by 2.46 billion bushels
annually (62.5 mmt)—more than the increase in total use.
is increased use of corn just for ethanol in the United
States was 48%—almost half—of the increase in corn use
for the entire world over the following five years. (Note:
Corn ethanol usage is calculated as 72.4% of the amount
USDA shows for the category “ethanol and by-products.”1)
With mandated ethanol taking 27% of the corn crop (net of
by-product credit), there is little doubt that biofuels play a
role in the price level, as indicated by Wright (2011, pp. 50-51):
In the case of biofuels, the eﬀect of this very large exogenous
diversion ramped up over a few years, has been treated as if
it were a relatively minor market disruption in several
influential policy pieces. On the other hand, Runge and
Senauer (2007), Mitchell (2008) and Abbott, et al. (2008
and 2009) were early papers that recognized the implications
of sharp mandated increases in corn ethanol for corn prices.
e second large demand growth category has been the use
of oilseeds—vegetable oils for biodiesel production, oilseed
meals for livestock production and vegetable oils for human
consumption. Figure 4 shows the increased use of oils for
biodiesel and industrial usage. e percent of total world
use going to industrial and biodiesel usage has increased
sharply since the mid-2000s. Rapeseed oil has been used
extensively for biodiesel in Europe. For the world, nearly
33% of total rapeseed oil is now used for industrial
purposes, compared to 17% in 2004-05, a 5 million metric
ton increase. Industrial uses of world soybean oil expanded
to 16% by 2010-11 from just 4% in 2004-05, a nearly 
6 million metric ton increase.
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Figure 3: World Corn Food, Seed and Industrial Use (mmt)
Source: FAS (2011) USDA PS&D online database
1 The USDA World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) report provides corn use for a category called corn use for “ethanol and
by-products.”  If corn and by-products are included together, USDA’s estimates are that 14% of corn use in 2005-06 was for ethanol and 37% in
2010-11. We, however, separate out the corn used to produce those by-products which include distillers’ grains, corn gluten feed, corn gluten meal
and corn oil, depending on whether the plants are dry mills or wet mills and whether dry mills use fractionation.  Here it is assumed that the corn
use for production of just the ethanol alone is 72.4% of the amount specified by USDA for “ethanol and by-products.”  Thus it is assumed that
27.6% of the corn is used to produce the by-products, primarily feed.  The calculation is based on dry mills producing distillers’ grains representing
18 pounds from each 56-pound corn bushel with dried distillers’ grains worth 86% of the value of corn. This is based on the average value of Iowa
dried distillers’ to Iowa corn-price-per-pound from January 2008 through April 2011 (USDA, Market News 2008-2011).  Thus 18/56*.86*100 =
27.6%. While this is still an imperfect calculation, it attempts to adjust USDA’s use of “corn and by-products” downward to account for by-products.Chinese Soybean Imports
e impact of growth in world oilseed use is also led by the
continued surge in soybean use in China for livestock feed,
human vegetable oil consumption and stock building in
recent years (Figure 5). After 1997-98, China largely
abandoned its soybean self-suﬃciency objectives,
concentrating on self-suﬃciency in feed grains, wheat and
rice. With continued increases in consumption, that has
resulted in massive additional imports of soybeans. In just
five years since 2005-06, annual Chinese soybean purchases
have more than doubled—increasing by 29 mmt. is increase
represents more than 90% of the increase in world imports.
e recent surge in Chinese soybean imports is the
consequence of stock-building, in addition to income
growth and dietary improvement. e Chinese had not held
large soybean stocks until recently, but in the last three years
they have accumulated stocks that equal nearly 23% of use.
Stock-building accounts for nearly 40% of the increase in
Chinese soybean imports since 2008.
Land Use and Stocks
e dual demand surges from biofuels and Chinese oilseed
needs are having a remarkable impact on the amount of
U.S. land required to meet those needs. For U.S. corn and
soybeans raised in 2005, 16.1 million acres of land were
required to meet these two demands, or 11.0% of corn and
soybean harvested acres (Figure 6). For the 2010 crop, corn
ethanol (by-product adjusted) and Chinese soybean
purchases from the United States required 46.5 million
acres, or 29.4% of harvested corn and soybean acres.
From the 2005 crop, 7.8 million corn acres were needed to
meet the ethanol needs (by-product adjusted). at climbed
to 23.7 million U.S. corn acres in 2010, an increase of 
15.9 million. U.S. soybean exports to China required the
production from 8.3 million acres of the 2005 crop, but
22.8 million acres of the 2010 crop—an additional 
14.5 million acres. ere were only minor changes in land
available from a somewhat smaller Conservation Reserve
Program (CRP) and modest reductions in hay acres. So in
the United States, these new demands were met primarily
from acreage shifting to corn and soybeans from wheat,
other feed grains, cotton and other oilseeds.
In addition, these new demands were also met by depleting
U.S. stocks. U.S. corn stocks at the end of 2005-06
represented 64 days of use, and in 2010-11 are expected to
be drawn down to the low level of 20 days. For soybeans,
the same numbers were 57 days and 20 days, respectively
(WAOB, June 2011). Clearly, these were large impacts on
U.S. supply and demand balances, as well as on acreage 
and stocks.
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Figure 4: World Oils: Industrial Use as Percent of Total
Source: FAS (2011) USDA PS&D online database5
Figure 5: Chinese Soybean Production, Consumption and Imports
Source: FAS (2011) USDA PS&D online database
Figure 6: U.S. Acres Required to Produce Ethanol (by-product adjusted) & Chinese Soybean Purchases from the U.S.
Source: FAS (2011) USDA PS&D online databasee impacts were also large in world markets. With prices
high for all crops, there are few alternatives to change
cropping patterns. e Chinese demand for soybeans was
also met by surges in production and exports from Latin
America. More than half of Chinese soybean imports were
sourced from Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay. Moreover,
Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay increased land devoted to
soybeans by more than 7 million hectares in 2009-10 and
2010-11 relative to land use just a few years earlier.
Limitations to further land use adjustments both in the
United States and globally are one factor contributing to the
inelasticity that is characteristic of global agricultural markets.
Issue 2: Inelasticity
One of the critical mechanisms behind what is happening in
agricultural commodity markets today is a reduction in
elasticity, or price responsiveness of demand and supply. 
As demand becomes more inelastic, responses to any real or
perceived supply shock become more volatile. Inelastic
supply aﬀects future price expectations and adjustment. 
e main sources of this inelasticity are:
• Tightness of land supply and limited reallocation possibilities,
• Biofuels policy constraints,
• Higher livestock prices contributing to persistent 
feed demands,
• Grain stocks and futures prices, and 
• Trade policies that isolate national markets.
Figure 7 illustrates what happens to price in response to
supply shocks as demand becomes more inelastic (Di). 
Any given supply shock (illustrated here as a leftward shift
in the supply curve) results in a more exaggerated price
response. Even without the supply shock, more inelastic 
and larger demand will result in higher prices and more of
the commodity being produced (P2 and Q2 in Figure 7). 
is result has been seen in U.S. corn production as 
farmers responded to higher corn prices with more corn
acreage and production. With the added supply shock (S1),
quantity produced falls to Q3 because of the supply shock,
but price moves even higher to P3. Supply shocks can be
real or perceived and can be positive or negative. 
Demand shocks also can perturb the system. e important
point is that the more inelastic is the demand curve, the
more exaggerated market movements will be. Prices will 
be more volatile. e sum of the impacts of these diﬀerent
mechanisms is not linearly additive—that is, the sum 
of the impacts of these diﬀerent mechanisms taken
individually is greater than each factor considered
in isolation.
With all these factors coming together, commodity demand
has become much less price responsive, at least in the short
run, than in previous years. Supply has also become more
inelastic, impacting both price levels and price volatility.
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Figure 7: Short-run Impacts of More Inelastic Corn Demand 
Source: FAS (2011) USDA PS&D online databaseLand Supply More Inelastic
Land has become an increasingly limited resource in 2011
compared to 2008. e world’s agricultural producers
responded to new demands by bringing more land into
production and shifting from low-demand growth crops to
high-demand growth crops. How big are each of these eﬀects?
First, land area for 13 major world crops increased by 27 million
hectares in the five years since 2005-06. is represents a 3%
expansion of harvested area, with most of the land expansion
occurring outside the United States (Figure 8). Twenty four
of the 27 million hectare expansion was in six countries or
regions: China, Sub-Saharan Africa, former Soviet Union,
Argentina, India and Brazil (in order of importance).
Acreage in the United States expanded by only 1.3 million
hectares for these 13 crops.
Second, to meet growing demands, land was shifted to
high-demand crops of corn, soybeans and rapeseed, an
increase of 30.5 million hectares worldwide. Rice increased
5 million hectares as nation’s encouraged expansion to
reduce food insecurity (Figure 9).
How important was world area expansion compared to
shifting from low-demand to high-demand growth crops?
e seven major crops that had increases in area in the past
five years totaled 38 million hectares (Figure 9). is was
composed of 27 million new hectares coming into
production and 11 million hectares shifting out of lower
demand crops. us, the expanded area for high-demand
crops was comprised of about 70% new area and 30%
displaced alternative crops. For the world, new acres were a
more important source of area expansion. In the United
States, land area was fairly stable, thus shifting land from
lower-demand to higher-demand uses was more important.
As more land comes into production, the productivity of
the new lands tends to be lower than previously cultivated
land, thus reducing the elasticity of the supply response. 
In 2008, some crops, such as cotton, had surpluses and low
prices that allowed flexibility to shift land out of those crops
to high-demand crops. As area shifted to corn, soybeans and
rapeseed to meet surging demand growth, and out of feed
grains, cotton and other oilseeds, inventories of the latter
crops tightened and prices surged.
is process of equating the marginal returns to land across
all crops has resulted in high prices for many crops as land is
the scare resource. Cotton is an example of how area and
price adjustments have responded to the strong demand
crops. By 2011, surging corn and oilseeds demand has
largely absorbed all of the surplus land, equating high corn
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Figure 8: World Harvested Hectares for 13 Major Crops
Source: FAS (2011) USDA PS&D online databaseand oilseed returns across other commodities that compete
for the same land. As a result, cotton stocks have tightened
significantly and prices have sharply exceeded 2008 highs.
With many crop prices at high levels, there is now less
flexibility to shift area.
Biofuels Policy Constraints
Because of biofuels policy, a high fraction of the demand for
corn is fixed, regardless of corn price. e Renewable Fuel
Standard established by the U.S. Congress in the Energy
Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007, and known
today as RFS2, eﬀectively mandates 15 billion gallons of
corn-based ethanol by 2015. e RFS level is a fixed
quantity of ethanol and therefore a fixed or minimum
quantity of corn that must be allocated to ethanol.
e other major issue faced by the ethanol industry is the
blend wall. e standard blending rate for ethanol into
gasoline is 10% (E10). e United States consumes about
138 billion gallons of gasoline each year. If that entire
quantity could be blended at 10%, the maximum size of the
market would be 13.8 billion gallons. Because of
infrastructure and other blending issues, all the gasoline
cannot be blended, so the eﬀective blending limit is about
12.5 billion gallons.
Some ethanol is sold as an E85 blend, which over the course
of a year is actually about 78% ethanol. e number of
E85-dispensing pumps and E85 capable vehicles is quite
small, and huge investments would be required to
significantly expand the E85 market (Tyner and Viteri,
2010, Tyner, et al., 2010). For 2011, the RFS2 mandate is
12.6 billion gallons and the blend wall is about the same
level—making the minimum and maximum consumption
levels very similar. If the blend wall is not increased, it
becomes the binding constraint and maintains ethanol
consumption a bit higher than the E10 limit of 12.6 billion
gallons. Both the RFS and the blend wall contribute to a
more inelastic corn market.
Currently in the corn ethanol industry, the blend wall and
the RFS2 are both at about the same level—12.6 billion
gallons. Actual production in 2010 was 13 billion gallons,
but 350 million gallons were exported. e exports were
made possible by the high value of the Brazilian Real and
high world sugar price, which led Brazil to produce more
sugar and less ethanol. Essentially the United States
displaced Brazilian exports in many parts of the world. If
the blend level does not increase to 15%, the blend wall will
remain the binding constraint. ere is some potential for
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Figure 9: Change in World Harvested Area for 13 Major Crops, 2010-11 versus 2005-06 
Source: FAS (2011) USDA PS&D online databaseE85 and other higher blends to grow, but it will be slow and
not likely to fill the gap between the blend wall and the
near-future RFS2 levels. If sugar prices and the Real remain
high, U.S. exports could continue to be strong. is would
constitute an elastic portion of the ethanol demand for
corn; however, it would be much a smaller volume than
domestic consumption.
High Livestock Prices and Persistent Feed Demand
In contrast to 2008, today’s livestock industries will be less
responsive in adjusting corn and soybean meal usage
downward in response to high grain and oilseed prices.
Livestock feed demand is expected to be more inelastic. 
In 2008 and 2009, the economic environment for animal
industries was characterized by large financial losses,
partially as a result of high feed prices that could not be
passed on to consumers. Large financial losses eventually led
to reduced production through some liquidation of herds
and flocks. Lower production shifted supply downward,
resulting in higher animal product prices. While there are
diﬀerences among species in 2011, animal production
operations are largely able to pay 2011 feed prices. us even
higher prices of corn and meal will be required to force herd
reductions in 2011. Consequently, some of the true impacts
of the higher feed prices in 2008 on consumer prices of
meats, dairy and poultry are just now reaching the world’s
consumers. In the United States, 2011 retail pork prices
have risen 14% and beef prices 11% above 2008 levels.
Grain Stocks and Futures Prices
When stocks are abundant, much of the adjustment to
supply or demand shocks is through changes in expected
carry-out stocks. Traders will carry supplies into the next
year rather than sell at even lower prices. Once stocks are
expected to be depleted, they can no longer adjust, and
carry-out stocks demand becomes very inelastic. Stocks-to-
use ratios are therefore often used by traders to gauge
market price expectations, and by analysts to explain how
tight supplies are in a given year. Moreover, tight stocks
make for less elastic markets, helping to explain spikes in
prices. is contributes to the observation above that the
eﬀects of shocks on prices are not linearly additive, since two
shocks may make for tight stocks when neither alone would.
One of the proposed explanations behind the 2008
commodity price spikes was very tight world grain stocks
that had been falling since 2000 (Trostle, 2008; Abbott,
Tyner and Hurt, 2008; Wright, 2011). Chinese
stockholding complicates interpretation and relevance of
world stocks. But when an appropriate measure of stocks-
to-use is low, high prices are usually seen. A dilemma yet to
be explained is why some prices seem high when stocks
appear to be adequate.
In relating stocks-to-use ratios to market prices in the short
run, expectations matter and vary over time. In the case of
2008 stocks data, expectations on the upcoming harvest
when prices peaked were more pessimistic than the actual
harvests that ultimately occurred.
High nearby futures market prices reflect the need to ration
available supplies this year, whereas distant futures prices
capture expectations in the coming years. e diﬀerence
between nearby and distant futures prices creates incentives
to increase or deplete stocks, depending on the sign. In the
past, when there were production shortfalls, nearby futures
prices would rise above distant futures prices, as is now the
case with corn. In the cases of wheat and rice, distant
futures prices now are above nearby prices, creating
incentives to store, and limiting further near-term stocks
adjustment in the face of seemingly high prices. 
While these stocks data are consistent with relative prices,
distant futures prices suggest substantially higher long-run
prices under normal stocks than was the case during most 
of the last decade.
International Trade
Another important mechanism by which countries adjust 
to production or demand shocks is international trade.
Conventional wisdom has been that the international
market faced by the United States is a more elastic demand
component than its domestic market since lower-income
foreign consumers would be more price sensitive. But the
combination of trade policy interventions worldwide,
intended to stabilize domestic markets, and other factors
result in more inelastic world markets.
As world prices increased in 2007 and 2008, countries
altered trade policies to isolate and partially stabilize their
domestic markets from eﬀects of those high prices. 
e most egregious measures—and most significant as a
factor behind world price spikes—were export restrictions,
especially for rice (e.g. Timmer, 2008; Mitra and Josling,
2009). Importers cut tariﬀs and taxes, drew from stocks,
and even subsidized imports and consumption to isolate
domestic markets from world prices (Demeke, Pangrazio
and Maetz, 2008). e collective action of many importers
to stabilize rather than to bear some of the adjustment
burden required in world markets surely contributed to the
inelasticity of those markets and so to the very high prices
that occurred.
9One noticeable eﬀect of price-insulating trade policy by
both importers and exporters is that both world trade
volume and U.S. exports did not fall from prior year
quantities in 2007 or 2008. Table 1 shows this outcome for
wheat, rice, corn and soybeans. Record exports—in
quantities, not just value—were realized for most of these
commodities. is trade behavior reflects two factors. 
First, net import demands, as well as domestic demand,
tend to be price inelastic, and supply in the very short run 
is very inelastic. Second, the trade policy responses taken
mean domestic market participants are isolated from the full
price changes occurring in world markets, further limiting
import quantity adjustments.
Inelastic import demand and sustained world trade is only
partially due to trade policy responses that isolate domestic
markets. Imperfect transmission of world prices to domestic
markets may be due to either policy changes or imperfect
market integration. Urban consumer markets may also be
better integrated with world markets than are rural markets
and farm prices. Moreover, in many countries trade is still
managed in some fashion by the government. ose public
entities were likely to maintain imports or reduce exports in
order to protect domestic food security. Panic buying was
noted by some observers (e.g. Timmer, 2008; Fan, Torero
and Headey, 2011) as some countries seemed to have
increased rather than reduced imports in the face of high
world prices. Often the state was involved in purchasing
imports earlier than normal and, in some cases, purchasing
greater imports than normal to be ready for future needs.
Trade policy responses are believed to be less important in
the current period of rising international agricultural
commodity prices than was the case in 2007-08. 
While some of the extreme trade policy measures have not
yet been repeated in the current agricultural price run-up,
the motivations behind trade policy mean international
agricultural markets remain thin and volatile. While Russia
banned wheat and coarse grains exports as a result of its
recent severe drought, that ban did not spread as had the
rice export bans. But countries that traditionally maintain
self-suﬃciency, notably China and India, continue to do so.
Other importers are also likely to be limiting pass-through
of high world prices. ere is evidence of early importing
and of actions by state traders to insure domestic supplies in
the face of high world prices. Moreover, there is evidence
that importers once again bought earlier in the season, as
U.S. exports have increased on an accelerated schedule
relative to past years (Trostle et. al, 2011). World trade is
not falling as prices are rising.
Table 1 shows that world and U.S. trade outcomes expected
in 2010-11 (WAOB, 2011) are similar to those in 2007-08
and are consistent with inelastic world markets. U.S. exports
and world imports are rising in spite of high world prices.
However, world wheat trade is expected to fall by about 8
million tons where weather problems resulted in shortages,
and U.S. corn exports may fall 1 million tons due to
expanding domestic industrial demand.
Issue 3: Weather and Stocks
Reduced production from adverse weather played an
important role in reducing world inventories in 2010-11,
and had a larger impact than in the 2008 price run-up.
World total grain production dropped 2.3 % or 51 mmt in
2010-11 from the previous year (USDA), and use exceeded
production by 53 mmt. By contrast, world production
dropped by 40 mmt in the two short production years of
2005-06 and 2006-07, contributing to high prices in 2008
(Figure 10).
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Table 1: World Trade and U.S. Exports from 2000 to 2011 (mmt)
Source: FAS (2011) USDA PS&D online database11
Figure 10: World Total Grains Production and Use
Source: FAS (2011) USDA PS&D online database
Table 2: Components of World Production During the Last Two Years
Source: FAS (2011) USDA PS&D online databaseTable 2 shows data for world production of major grains
and soybeans. e largest production losses in 2010-11 were
led by a 37 mmt decrease in world wheat, the result of
harmful weather in the Black Sea region, Canada and
Australia. World wheat production dropped five percent.
World barley production dropped 27 mmt, as about 10% of
the acreage shifted to high-demand crops. Barley yields
dropped 9%, primarily due to drought in Europe and the
former Soviet Union, the same regions where wheat has
been severely aﬀected. While world corn production was up
modestly, U.S. yields were 7% or 23 mmt lower than
anticipated. With normal corn yields needed to meet
rapidly growing needs, the shortfall caused extreme
tightening of stocks. World soybean production was also
negatively impacted as yields dropped 1%, primarily due to
yield losses in Argentina, but world production was still up
0.3%. Rapid growth in use, i.e. Chinese imports, meant
stocks tightened. Rice production was favorable with higher
area and yields.
As shown in Figure 11, continued strong growth in demand
and reductions in production mean world stocks-to-use
levels tightened for most major crops in 2010-11, with the
exception of rice.
Data for expected stocks in 2010-11 show significant
diﬀerences among the major agricultural commodities.
Table 3 shows the relative changes in stocks levels over the
past decade for the world, the United States, China and the
world less China.
• In 2010-11 expected corn stocks are extraordinarily low 
both in the United States and for the world less China. 
Corn prices have exceeded the 2008 peaks. Reported 
stocks of corn in China remain high, distorting world 
stocks as a relevant measure.
• Soybean stocks are especially tight in the United States, 
where soybeans and corn compete for land. Since its 
suppliers have not historically held large stocks, China 
substantially increased its soybean stocks in both 
2009-10 and 2010-11, contributing to its increased 
import demand. Once again, world stocks present a 
distorted picture. Soybean prices in 2011 reached about 
90% of 2008 highs.
• Wheat stocks were high regardless of measure in 
2009-10, allowing adjustment to severe production 
shocks in 2010-11. Hence, wheat prices reached only 
65% of the 2008 peak. 
• Rice stocks are reasonable, based on historical 
standards, increasing in almost all measures. Rice prices 
remain well below 2008 peaks.
• Record high prices for sugar and cotton in 2011 are 
consistent with expected low stocks. In 2008, when 
there were large stocks of cotton and sugar, prices did 
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Figure 11: World Stocks-to-Use Ratios from WASDE
Source: FAS (2011) USDA PS&D online databasenot soar. Since then, land has shifted away from these 
crops, stocks have dwindled and 2011 prices have 
soared to record highs.
Issue 4: Chinese Policy
China figures prominently in supply and use explanations of
world trade, with specific attention now to be focused on
Chinese stockholding. Based on averages for the last three
crop years, China accounts for 19% of world grain
production and 32% of ending stocks, but only 1.6% of
imports and 0.6% of exports. In the case of soybeans,
however, China now accounts for only 6% of production,
57% of world imports and 23% of world ending stocks.
Many researchers misunderstood the importance of Chinese
trade and stocks policies—and of grain self-suﬃciency. 
is, in turn, leads to misunderstanding of the world supply
and use situation relative to the agricultural price increases
in 2007-08. One theme was that world stocks had been
declining since 2000, leading to tightness in grain markets,
and significantly contributing to high prices in 2008.
Headey and Fan (2010) noted that when using stocks for
the world less China, as shown in Table 3, low stocks
explanations for those events are harder to defend. e
draw-down in world stocks during the first half of the last
decade was, to a larger extent, due to the Chinese reducing
their enormous stockpile of grain, while at the end still
holding for most grains more than 30% of annual use.
If Chinese grain markets were disconnected from world
markets, neither importing nor exporting significant
quantities of grain, variations in stocks levels would be
disconnected from world markets. In fact, yearly variations
in Chinese grain ending stocks, responding to domestic
circumstances, were an order of magnitude larger than
variations in trade levels. In examining the 2007-08 U.S.
stocks-to-use ratios or world stocks less Chinese stocks, the
importance of low stocks appears to be evident only in the
wheat market. Today, regardless of measures used, stocks-to-
use ratios are more directly related to prices.
A key factor behind Chinese behavior, and one that varies
across commodities, is the nature of Chinese trade policy
and how that aﬀects its role in particular markets. In the
case of grains, China is among the most isolated and self-
suﬃcient countries. Net trade is less than 1% of production
and use, and domestic prices bear little relationship to world
prices. In the case of soybeans, China abandoned self-
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Table 3: Stocks-to-Use Ratios in % for Corn, Wheat, Rice, Soybeans and Cotton
Source: FAS (2011) USDA PS&D online database14
Figure 12: Chinese Supply-Utilization Balances for Grains and Soybeans
Source: FAS (2011) UDSA PS&D online datasetsuﬃciency in the mid-1990s, relying on trade to supply
82% of the requirements of its domestic market. China’s
supply-utilization balances for wheat, rice, corn and
soybeans from 2000 to 2011, shown in Figure 12,
demonstrate these outcomes.
Figure 12 shows the extent of self-suﬃciency in grains
maintained by China from 2000. Production and use are
about equal, while exports and imports are barely visible at
the bottom of the graphs. Use exceeded production as
China drew down very large stocks until about 2006. 
China increased large stocks positions again after the 2006-
08 crisis. With soybeans, production is flat but use has been
increasing the entire decade, and stocks began to increase
after 2008. More than 40% of the increase in Chinese
soybean imports since 2008 is due to stocks increases. 
While grains stocks also increased, that has occurred out of
domestic production rather than from imports.
Grain and oilseed prices may be part of a general
commodity boom that is surely being driven, at least in
part, by rapid economic growth in developing economies.
But the role of Chinese and Indian economic growth for
food grains is often exaggerated. Both Abbott, Hurt and
Tyner (2008) and Headey and Fan (2010) argue that trade
policies leading to self-suﬃciency means the importance of
these eﬀects on Chinese and Indian domestic markets has
had limited spillover onto international markets. Figure 12
shows the extreme degree of self-suﬃciency and the lack of
connection between Chinese domestic grain markets and
trade levels. Moreover, those trade levels are small relative to
most world grain markets. Similar graphs were shown by
Abbott, Hurt and Tyner (2008) for India. is self-suﬃciency
policy led to domestic grain prices disconnected from world
prices (Timmer, 2008; Abbott, 2011). Domestic price data
show soybean prices more closely following world prices.
e important exception to this is Chinese soybean trade,
where a completely diﬀerent trade policy regime is in place.
Over the last few years, China’s food grain trade policy has
become even more inward looking, while soybean and crude
oil regimes have become increasingly open. As noted earlier,
the recent soybean stock building by China has contributed
importantly to its increasing soybean imports. While the imports
reflect a relatively open market, the stocks increases show an
active government that remains concerned with food supplies.
Some argue that feed demand—and so coarse grains trade—
is becoming more open, since China has recently switched
to a net corn importer. But corn imports only reached 1.3
million tons in 2009-10 and are projected to be only 1
million tons in 2010-11. is remains less than 1% of
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Figure 13: Corn Price in $ and Euros
Note: Monthly corn prices in $ and ᾬ are expressed as an index equal to 1 on average in 2002
Source: IMF, 2011Chinese corn production and 1.5% of world corn trade.
Similarly, when drought threatened China’s wheat harvest
this year, some argued this would impact world prices. 
But China held large wheat stocks, and historically would
have drawn from those stocks rather than import wheat.
Not surprisingly then, world markets did not react strongly
to that news.
Issue 5: Macroeconomics Still Matters
e exchange rate was ultimately identified by many
analysts as a key factor explaining high commodity prices
in 2008—even if some early work discounted eﬀects on
agricultural trade and prices (e.g. Collins, 2008). Some argued
that the exchange rate may capture eﬀects of broader
macroeconomic forces, such as inflationary expectations,
which could even help explain why speculation matters
(Abbott, Hurt and Tyner, 2009). While the dramatic
changes seen from 2002 to 2008 are not occurring today,
the dollar remains weak and the macroeconomic
environment continues to influence commodity prices.
Weak Dollar Exchange Rate
In 2002, a Euro cost US$0.90. When the dollar was
weakest in mid-2008, a Euro cost nearly US$1.60. e
dollar strengthened in late 2008 as recession spread
worldwide and financial crisis set in. Once again the dollar
served as a safe haven for international financial
transactions. But at the dollar’s strongest, a Euro cost
US$1.19. e dollar has since weakened and at this writing
has varied between US$1.40 and US$1.49. While the dollar
remains quite weak relative to historical standards, it is not
yet as weak as in mid-2008. Macroeconomic events,
including debt concerns in Europe and monetary policy
here and abroad, have influenced the value of the dollar 
and caused some significant swings since mid-2008.
A weak dollar means commodity prices seem less expensive
for those countries whose currencies have appreciated
relative to the dollar. Abbott, Tyner and Hurt (2008)
presented the prices of crude oil and several agricultural
commodities in dollars versus Euros to emphasize the
importance of the weak dollar in explaining high
international agricultural prices denominated in dollars in
2008. When the dollar strengthened in the second half of
2008, the gap between dollar and Euro-denominated prices
narrowed. Figure 13 shows that as the dollar has weakened
once again, the gaps for corn and other commodities have
also widened, if not to the same extent it had reached when
the dollar was at its weakest.
Figure 14 shows variations in important bilateral exchange
rates, emphasizing the fact that specific changes relative to
important traders matter to agricultural markets. at figure
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Figure 14: Bilateral Exchange Rates, 2000 to 2011
Note: Monthly exchange rates are expressed as an index equal to 1 on average in 2002.  
Source, IMF, 2011shows the small changes in the Chinese Yuan, that some
argue remains undervalued, contributing to a persistent
U.S. trade deficit. Revaluing the Yuan would make imports
into China cheaper, including soybeans. Figure 14 also
shows the more extreme variations in the Brazilian Real, the
currency of an important competitor in key commodity
markets, especially soybeans. While the overall pattern and
timing relative to the Euro show up in other currencies,
magnitudes diﬀer. A noteworthy characteristic of this data is
that USDA’s agricultural trade-weighted exchange rate index
does not show the variability or changes seen in bilateral
rates or other indices. at index may be heavily weighted
by China and by importers, who peg their currency to the
dollar, and does not include competing exporters. is may
have led some to discount the importance of the exchange
rate as a factor behind agricultural price changes in 2007-
08. e same concerns are not evident in the IMF’s nominal
exchange rate index for the United States, which follows the
path of the Euro.
Bilateral exchange rate adjustments have altered the
competitive position of the U.S. relative to Brazil in the
Chinese soybean market. With the Yuan pegged to the
dollar, U.S. soybeans remain cheap in China, while
appreciating currencies in Brazil would drive down domestic
currency soybean prices there. e Argentine currency has
not appreciated relative to the dollar, but Argentina has
imposed export taxes on soybeans. Nevertheless, soybean
production and exports have increased from both these
Latin American sources.
If the United States were a small country in international
agricultural markets, the law of one price linking exchange
rates to dollar-denominated commodity prices would yield a
proportional relationship. Since the United States is a large
trader influencing world price in most commodity markets,
the law of one-price relationship would suggest a less than
proportional response to exchange rate changes. Historical
correlations of commodity prices with exchange rate
changes suggest a more than proportional relationship,
however. is means more than just transmission of prices
across borders is captured in the commodity price-exchange
rate relationship. is may be caused by some fixed price-
flexible price overshooting adjustment mechanism, or may
simply be a correlation among macroeconomic variables
that influence the exchange rate. Inflationary expectations
are one possible factor related to both exchange rates and
commodity prices. e nominal exchange rate may reflect
either some investors with high inflationary expectations or
loose monetary policy in the United States. Economic
growth, and expectations of growth, may also influence
both exchange rates and commodity prices. us, the weak
dollar may be a cause of high agricultural prices, but may
also be a symptom of broader worldwide macroeconomic
forces influencing those prices.
Macroeconomic Performance and Commodity Booms
Macroeconomic variables determine the background
environment in which supply-utilization events play out.
Exchange rates, business cycles (economic growth), interest
rates and inflationary expectations are among the more
important macroeconomic factors influencing international
commodity pricing. ree issues related to the macro
economy bear further investigation:
• the role of recession and financial crisis in ending the 
earlier commodity boom,
• the role of and explanation behind agricultural prices 
“overshooting” exchange rate changes, and
• the role of speculation as a factor behind past and 
current commodity price increases.
Understanding each issue requires a better understanding of
relationships between inflationary expectations, exchange
rates and commodity prices.
Agricultural markets were a latecomer to the commodity
boom that started about 2003 and ended in mid-2008 at
the same time that agricultural prices peaked. Some have
argued that a new commodity boom began in mid-2009 as
the great recession ended and economic growth increased
worldwide, especially in developing economies that are
demanding more energy, metals and agricultural
commodities (IMF, 2009). Both rapid economic growth
and inflationary expectations worldwide are believed to
contribute to rising commodity prices. Economic growth
leads to greater demand pressure, which would be lower for
commodities where income elasticities of demand, as for
food, are low. If the eﬀects observed are entirely due to
demand pressure, what is being observed now is real relative
price shifts, not inflation. If, as some believe, future
inflation is likely, commodity prices can also represent the
leading-edge of higher inflation to come in the future. In its
initial stages, demand pressure due to economic growth and
inflation shows up more in those prices that are flexible, and
less so in prices that are sticky. Hence, commodity prices
increase before manufacturing prices, services prices or wages,
and likely more so in the short run than the long run.
Nominal exchange rates also reflect inflationary
expectations. One explanation for the weak dollar both in
the first half of 2008 and now must be looser monetary
policy in the United States than abroad. e United States
began cutting interest rates to fight inflation in August
2007, while the European central bank did not do so until
17July 2008, when the dollar reversed direction. ese were
key moments in the 2007-08 commodity price run-up. 
It is believed that the United States is now holding to low
interest rates, and implementing quantitative easing to a
degree that is more likely to be inflationary than are the
monetary policies of most other developed country central
banks. As of April 2011, the European central bank began
to increase interest rates, while the U.S. Federal Reserve
maintained quantitative easing through June 2011. 
In some developing countries inflation is now more
prominent, and policies are shifting in some places to 
fight potential future inflation.
On the other hand, it must be recognized that measures of
current inflation in the United States remain low, and excess
capacity and unemployment remain important problems.
Commodity prices, including agricultural prices, may be
increasing in dollar terms both because of economic growth
that is stronger now in developing countries, and because of
the potential for future increases in inflation. Exchange rates
are both a symptom and a transmission mechanism for
these eﬀects.
Recession and Financial Crisis
e 2003-08 commodity boom began with recovery from
the 2001 recession. e recession that spread worldwide in
mid-2008 and became severe due to the financial crisis in
September 2008, is one important factor explaining the fall
in agricultural commodity prices. Until those
macroeconomic events played out, expectations in mid-
2008 were that some prices could trend even higher.
Moreover, the combination of recession and financial crisis
led to an unprecedented collapse of world trade in late 2008
and early 2009. Worldwide, short-term trade levels fell 60%
according to IMF (2010) data. WTO annual data for 2009
show a 23% fall in world trade in 2009, the first such
significant fall in years. While higher prices had not earlier
curtailed agricultural imports, recession and financial crisis
did. Several factors may explain the collapse in trade. 
While incomes fell worldwide, commodities exhibiting low-
income elasticities of demand saw smaller trade eﬀects.
Trade requires both foreign exchange and finance, however,
so financial crisis and depreciating exchange rates in
importing countries would both limit imports.
Recovery since mid-2009, which is now stronger in
developing countries, apparently restarted a commodity
boom and is contributing to rising commodity prices. Once
again, agricultural prices have lagged energy and metals, but
the pressures that led to commodity prices rising surely have
spilled over to agricultural goods. us, business cycles and
economic growth, as well as inflationary impacts, have likely
contributed to price increases with recovery and price
decreases during recession. Moreover, the changes in
expected inflation and in the value of the dollar have likely
led to a shift in mean agricultural prices to a higher level
now than was realized in 2000-2005. A new recession could
once again lower agricultural prices.
Speculation
Inflationary expectations, a weak dollar and economic
recovery are factors that have led to “financialization” of
commodity markets, and the emergence of “speculators”
using investment instruments based on commodity prices.
e commodity booms have spawned commodity index
funds and exchange-traded funds, allowing investors to
potentially profit from rising commodity prices. ere were
substantial increases in demand for agricultural commodity
futures contracts, evidenced by huge increases in the
number of contracts issued and open interest in those
markets. at interest has been attributed to these new
investment vehicles and to expectations by some investor’s
that commodity prices would continue to rise.
is demand for futures contracts to back commodity-based
investment vehicles has led some to argue that the
substantial amount of money going into these investments
fueled higher grain prices. Others argued that the price
expectations on which these investments were based were
unrealistic in light of market fundamentals. According to
that argument, increasing demand from uninformed
speculators for financial instruments backed by commodity
futures contracts created a bubble in agricultural markets
and disconnect prices from supply-use balances.
Controversy persists on the importance of speculation and
the financialization of commodity markets as factors behind
increasing commodity prices. While the sheer amount of
money invested in commodities convinced many that
speculation must matter, most experts in commodity
markets insist that unless these vehicles in some way alter
supply-use balance, spot market prices should be unaﬀected.
It is also argued that there is no evidence that such
mechanisms can be found (Irwin and Sanders, 2010;
Wright, 2011). Gilbert (2010), however, believes common
macroeconomic factors, possibly including speculation, may
have played a significant role in 2008.
Regardless of how one stands in that debate, one factor that
matters is future expectations on agricultural prices. Futures
markets have historically represented the best assessment of
where the market is on that. Futures prices in 2007-08
behaved diﬀerently than prior spikes in agricultural
commodity prices. In the past, when there were short-term
shortages and spot prices as well as nearby futures prices
18increased, distant futures prices did not increase nearly as
much, reflecting expectations that prices would return to
lower historical means. In 2007-08, distant futures prices
were at or above spot prices, reflecting market expectations
that prices would continue to rise. In the current price run-
up, distant futures prices for corn have remained below
nearby and spot prices, reflecting expectations that prices
would again return to lower levels. But those longer-term
expectations are substantially above the mean nominal
prices realized from 2000 to 2006. Distant futures prices 
for soybeans and wheat exhibit the pattern of 2008, and 
are higher than recent historical means.
Expectations on distant futures prices depend on two broad
factors: long-run supply-use balance and long-run
expectations on the macroeconomic environment.
Expectations in mid-2008 may have been based on simply
misinformed speculation, on expectations concerning
production and demand that ultimately were incorrect but
nevertheless were valid fundamentals-based expectations, or
on assumptions concerning an inflationary macroeconomic
scenario that proved incorrect as the great recession unfolded.
Implications for the Future
Will Demand Surges Persist?
Increasing use of corn for biofuels in the United States and
increasing Chinese demand for U.S. soybean imports are
key drivers of the 2011 commodity price increases. What
are the likely near-term future directions for these drivers?
e United States produced 13 billion gallons of ethanol in 2010
and has production capacity today exceeding 14 billion gallons.
e portion of the RFS which can be met by corn starch is
15 billion gallons by 2015. In other words, the mandated level
has essentially been reached, and growth will be quite slow
moving forward. In fact, from this point forward, normal
trend yield increases will be able to satisfy the future increases
in corn-based ethanol demand. e level and percentage of
corn use for ethanol will remain high, but growth will be low. 
e outlook is similar for Chinese soybean imports. Table 2
shows that Chinese soybean stocks have now reached 23%
of use, the highest level of the past decade. China will not
continue to build stocks much beyond this level. China will,
however, continue to import large amounts of soybeans to
fill the domestic gap between consumption and
production—not to further accumulate stocks.
Both of the key demand drivers responsible for today’s price
situation are expected to have less growth in the future, but
today’s large demand levels will not go away. With the
reduced growth rates, it will be much easier for global
production to catch up with demand—a scenario that is
expected to take at least two years. Prices are not anticipated
to remain at the recent record levels beyond that two-year
period unless there are serious weather and yield problems.
Short Term: Normal or Sub-Trend Yields?
Normal Yields Not Likely to Restore World Supply 
in 2011-12
Will normal yields in 2011-12 restore more favorable world
inventories? e best answer appears to be that normal
yields will just allow the world to keep up with the strong
demand. Stocks will not be substantially improved, and
overall high prices by historical standards will tend to persist
for at least one more year.
is conclusion is based on the May 2011 World
Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE)
update from USDA (WAOB, 2011), which tends to use
trend yields. In the WASDE analysis, stocks-to-use ratios 
for total world grains would actually tighten somewhat.
Stocks-to-use would improve a bit for corn, soybeans and
cotton, but would erode modestly for wheat and rice. 
Since both wheat and rice currently have reasonable stocks
levels, this implies a shift away from higher-stocks crops to
lower-stocks crops. However, the important point is that
normal yields in 2011-12 only modestly improve stock
levels of the current high-price crops of corn, soybeans 
and cotton.
Cotton and corn had record high prices in the spring of
2011. ose extreme price levels reflect very tight stocks and
very strong returns for producers. us land area is expected
to shift toward those crops, moderating prices somewhat.
However, prices for 2011 and 2012 would remain high by
historic measures. Stocks positions for soybeans, wheat and
rice are more adequate, in that order. Even with futures
prices suggesting persistence of current prices for soybeans
and appreciating prices in 2012 and 2013 for wheat and
rice, the premium to returns to land in corn mean acreage
for that crop will expand and will likely fall for wheat, rice
and soybeans.
As expected, the persistence of high prices varies by
commodity. Figure 15 illustrates the persistence of selected
grain and oilseed futures market prices in early May 2011.
e bars represent the futures prices for the July futures
contracts for 2011, 2012 and 2013 expressed as a
percentage of the current July 2011 price. Cotton and rice
futures were not yet trading July 2013 contracts. In general,
futures markets also reflect high price persistence.
19Much is riding on 2011-12 production. A return to normal
yields barely allows the world to continue to meet trend
consumption. Yield uncertainty means there may be wide
swings in prices. Yields below trend imply a need to ration
short supplies, with prices even higher than those of the
first-half of 2011. Yields above trend could mean some
moderation in prices, but not nearly as large as was experienced
in late 2008 and 2009 with worldwide recession.
In the absence of yields well above trend, it appears the tight
world stocks situation cannot be overcome in one crop year,
and high prices will persist for two crop years or longer. In
essence, high prices, at least by historical standards, appear
to be the new norm. Meanwhile, the world is walking close
to the edge of food insecurity with the potential for extraordinarily
high prices in any year of major production setbacks.
Sub-Trend Yields in 2011-12
Sub-trend yields are, of course, a possibility in 2011-12 and
imply rationing of supplies that will be too short to meet
trend consumption. Total grain yields one standard
deviation below trend would represent a drop in production
of about 50 mmt. e reduction of 50 mmt from trend
would be similar to the shortfall of production that occurred
in 2010-11. Back-to-back shortfalls of that size would imply
the necessity of end users cutting back about 1% on total
usage from 2010-2011 levels. While this seems like a small
amount, it is large in a world of growing demand. For
historical perspective, since 1960-61 there have only been
four years when total consumption declined, and three of
those years were less than 1%.
Production shortfalls in corn, soybeans or cotton would
require more severe end-user cutbacks, since there are
almost no stocks on which to draw. e most serious
cutbacks in usage would be in corn, where a one standard
deviation yield reduction from trend would reduce world
production about 28 mmt. Similar levels of production
shortfalls in wheat and rice would not require as severe of
cutbacks in use, because there are more adequate stocks
from which to draw. In an open market, the mechanism 
for usage reduction is higher prices. Prices must rise to
discourage a suﬃcient number of end users to reduce
purchases. e particular commodities that experience
supply shortfalls would also be important to price levels.
Supply shortfalls in corn, soybeans or cotton, where
shortages are already dire, would likely generate new all-
time record prices. On the other hand, if the production
set-backs were in wheat or rice, new price highs might not
be established.
Longer-Term: Can Supply Catch Up?
Barring any major weather problems, the current tight
stocks period and relative high prices are expected to continue
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Figure 15: Futures Price Persistence July 2011, 2012 and 2013 (May 5, 2011)
Source: Chicago Mercantile Exchange quotes21
Figure 16: Real Corn Prices (2010=100), U.S. Corn Yields and Real Revenue per Acre 
Source: USDA (NASS and ERS)for the next one to two years. Ultimately, the question is
whether world supplies can not only catch up with recent
demand increases but keep pace with demand growth over
time. An added question is what the impacts would be on
prices, food and fuel availability, and food security.
History suggests that periods of unusually high prices do
not continue and, in fact, have been followed by long
periods of low prices. Figure 16 illustrates these price cycles. 
When spanning such a long time period, two problems
arise: inflation had large impacts on prices, and yields
changed sharply over this period. For this reason annual
nominal corn prices received by U.S. farmers are adjusted
by the CPI (2010=100) to form a real price. ese real
prices are shown in the upper portion of the figure and are
scaled on the right hand side. e impact of steady yield
increases after 1940 also had a powerful influence on real
prices. ese yield increases are the primary reason for sharp
declines in real prices, especially after 1950. Corn yield per
acre is also shown in the top of the figure and is scaled on
the left side.
e lower portion of the figure shows real revenue per acre,
a combination of the real price times the yield per acre. 
As such, it shows the combined impacts of the two big
changes over this long period. e cycle becomes evident
with four periods of revenue surges: during World War I
and World War II, the 1970s and very early 1980s, and 
the current period of 2007 to 2011, a cycle which is now
playing out. In all four, a demand surge caused prices to
initially move higher. In each of the first three periods, 
there was a large price collapse after the demand surge, 
with subsequent long periods of low prices and low revenues.
e robustness of each boom/bust cycle depends on the
magnitude of the demand shocks, short-crop production
years during the demand shocks, the responsiveness of
supply to higher prices, and macroeconomic events. As an
example, the World War II surge was not as large due to the
use of wage and price controls, and the downside in the
1950s was not as severe due to strong macroeconomic
growth in the United States.
Similar to the first three periods, the 2007-2011 boom is in
place due to demand surges—for biofuels and soybean
exports to China. One of the most important potential
diﬀerences is that the factors which caused the previous
three demand surges did not persist. In the World Wars,
European production was reduced due to hostilities and the
United States, Canada and Australia became the major food
suppliers to Europe. When hostilities ended, European
farmers returned to production and U.S. food exports fell.
In the 1970s, corn exports, as an example, increased by a
factor of nearly five times from 1970 to the peak in 1979.
But, by 1985, exports had declined by one-half.
Today, biofuels demand is expected to persist up to the 15-
billion-gallon ethanol mandate under the RFS, and Chinese
soybean demand is expected to persist and may even grow,
but at a slower rate. e surging nature of those demands
over the past five years was one of the critical factors in the
price peaks. ese demands will now grow much more
slowly as the United States approaches the RFS mandate
and as China has built soybean stocks back to acceptable
levels. is means the world supply will have a better chance
to catch up in coming years and return stocks back to more
adequate levels. is may not result in a bust, but rather a
moderation of the extreme prices and high revenues
experienced in the 2007 to 2011 period. Of course, other
factors—such as biofuels policies around the world, supply
responses and macroeconomic events—will all influence
how this cycle finally plays out.
Demand Challenges and Opportunities
e United Nations estimates world population will reach
9.1 billion people by 2050, with nearly all that growth
coming in developing countries. People will be living in
primarily urban areas—wholly dependent on someone else
for food production. FAO contends overall food production
must increase by 70% by 2050—and that does not include
growth in other uses such as biofuels. Furthermore, 80% 
of the production expansion must come from higher
productivity, with only 20% from more production area.
is expansion must be done in a world of dwindling
natural resources in a period of potential global warming,
which may slow productivity growth rates. is is a
troubling vision of the future challenges (FAO, 2009).
While there are many challenges, there are opportunities, 
as well. To the extent prices are higher in the longer run,
farmers will be induced globally to increase acreage and
production. In other words, there would be a global
response to the higher prices resulting in more crop
production and ultimately a moderating of high prices. 
At present there are many regions of the world with grain
yields less than half those in the United States, but with
adequate soils and available rainfall. One study of yield gaps
for major crops (Licker, et al. 2010) estimates that 50%
more maize, 40% more rice, 20% more soybeans, and 60%
more wheat could be produced globally if the top 95% of
croplands produced at their current climatic potential.
Clearly, in practice all this potential could not be realized. 
It does, however, illustrate the broad scope for yield
increases globally if economic incentives are strong.
22Table 4 provides data on test plot corn yields compared with
farmer yields in diﬀerent world regions to indicate the size
of yield gaps. e test plots are composed entirely of hybrid
varieties and generally do not include genetically-engineered
traits for herbicide or insect resistance. is creates some
diﬀerences between the test plots and local production
practices. Many countries, such as Mexico and India, still
plant significant amounts of open pollinated varieties
(OPV), which generally have lower yields than hybrid
varieties. In other countries, such as the United States,
Argentina and South Africa, a large percentage of the
production fields will include genetically-engineered traits
for herbicide and/or insect resistance. e insect resistance
traits provide superior protection from insect damage than
do chemical insecticides, which can lead to higher average
yields. e last column indicates the level of agronomic
technology that was used in the test plots. For example, low
technology could involve hand planting, weeding, harvest
and nutrient application. e United States yield gap
evidenced in Table 4 is around 20%, but other countries
have gaps as high as 75%, indicating a tremendous potential
for achieving higher productivity using existing agricultural
technologies in these areas.
Higher corn prices could induce farmers in these areas to
make technical changes, such as improved seed varieties or
higher fertilizer use, which would help close the yield gap
somewhat. In fact, this outcome could be quite positive as
much of this area is in developing countries with poor
farmers. Higher revenue from sales of grains at higher
market prices could help alleviate poverty in these areas. 
e potential poverty reductions would not apply to all
rural residents, but mainly to land-owning farmers.
A precondition for achieving this supply response,
production increase and possible poverty reduction is that
developing country governments permit higher world prices
to be transmitted to their farmers. In the 2008 price run-up,
many developing country governments attempted to
prevent the higher world prices from spilling over into their
markets. Governments adopt such policies in an attempt to
protect the politically powerful urban consumers but to the
detriment of their rural populations.
e magnitude of supply response over time also would
depend on the diﬃculty of removing very important
constraints in credit markets, rural infrastructure, marketing
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Table 4: Test Plot and Country Average Maize Yields: Selected Countries 2008 to 2010
Source: Mike Edgerton, Monsanto Corp.infrastructure, crop insurance and institutions. e diﬃculty
of making these changes will vary region-to-region, but
higher price will be an inducement to move in the direction
of higher productivity. e World Bank (2008) estimates
that 70% of the world’s poor live in rural areas in developing
countries and derive their primary livelihood from agriculture.
While it is not entirely clear how the diﬀerent segments of
the rural economy would fare from higher prices, and it
would vary from one region to another, it is likely that to
the extent that governments permit higher world prices to
be transmitted to rural areas, farmers would respond with
higher production, resulting in higher rural incomes.
e bottom line is that the short-run and long-run impacts
of higher commodity prices could be very diﬀerent. Short-
run volatility from supply or demand shocks is inevitable. In the
longer-run, however, there is potential gain in poor, rural
areas through higher incomes from the induced supply response.
Another factor that works in the opposite direction is
climate change. Most studies predict greater variability 
in rainfall and warmer weather due to climate change. 
In most world regions, these climate changes induce yield
reductions. A recent study (Lobell, et al., 2011) estimated
that climate change that occurred between 1980 and 2008
has led to major crop prices already being somewhat higher
than they would have been without the climate change.
Predictions for the future are for much larger yield changes,
which would lead to larger price increases. is is a concern
with high uncertainty, but likely to be a factor of increasing
importance in the future.
Consequences Here and Abroad
Attention is already being given to food inflation—a
significant potential consequence that may develop if food
processors, distributors and restaurants pass along higher
commodity prices. USDA (ERS, 2011) now predicts U.S.
food inflation could reach as high as 4% in 2011. As of May
2011, food inflation year-over-year was 3.4%, while core
inflation (CPI less food and energy) was 1.5%, resulting in
an increasing relative cost for food. Energy inflation is more
problematic now at 21.5%. is inflationary experience is
not yet as severe as in 2008, however. In July 2008, year-
over-year food inflation equaled 6.0%, energy inflation was
even higher at 29.3%, while core inflation was only 2.5%
(BLS, 2011). It is important to recognize that these statistics
mean food and energy costs were rising relative to both costs
of other goods and wages at these times. In 2009, recession
meant deflation was evident for these two volatile categories,
while core inflation fell but did not become negative.
Food inflation in 2008 was stronger in many developing
countries than in major exporting countries, even when
world prices were not fully transmitted to domestic prices.
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), by February 2008 food
inflation had already exceeded 20% in Kenya, China and 
Sri Lanka, and was at more than 10% in another eight
developing countries (OECD-FAO, 2008). Only three
developing countries were reported to have experienced
food inflation less that 10%; all were higher than U.S. food
inflation at 5.1% at that same time. In poor countries, 
the share of expenditure on food is much larger, food
expenditures include more staples, and food prices include
smaller food processing and distribution costs. Higher food
prices were politically sensitive and even led to food riots 
in many countries at price increases much smaller than the
increases in world prices.
In developed countries, the shrinking margins of livestock
producers, food processors and distributors cushioned the
eﬀects on consumers in 2007-08. More of the grain and
feed cost increases may be showing up as food inflation in
developed countries now, as livestock prices are higher and
processors and retailers are less willing to reduce margins.
Food inflation in many developing countries in 2008
exceeded U.S. food inflation in both 2008 and today.
Poverty and hunger became worse where domestic food
prices rose. e World Bank (2009) estimated that high
food prices in 2008 put an additional 105 million people in
extreme poverty. USDA (Rosen and Shapouri, 2008) and
FAO (2008) estimated that between 75 million and 133
million additional people suﬀered from malnutrition. e
World Bank (2011) now estimates that the current price
run-up has put an additional 44 million people in extreme
poverty. Where policy measures were pursued to mitigate
eﬀects of high world prices, eﬀects on poverty and hunger
were reduced, however (Headey, 2011).
Policy Issues
ree distinct sets of policy issues are relevant to the above




e United States began subsidizing biofuels in 1978 with
the passage of the National Energy Policy Conservation Act
of 1978 (Tyner, 2008; U.S. Congress, 1978). Biofuels policy
objectives have evolved over time but have included increasing
farm income, improving environmental quality, and increasing
24national energy security. Since 1978, the subsidy has ranged
between 40ﾢ per gallon and 60ﾢ per gallon of ethanol, and
is currently 45ﾢ per gallon. From 1984 to 2003, the price 
of crude oil averaged about $20/bbl., and the subsidy was
suﬃcient to promote a slow but steady growth in the
ethanol industry as illustrated in Figure 17.
In 1983 ethanol production was 375 million gallons,
growing to 2.8 billion gallons by 2003. By 2010—in just
seven years—it jumped to 13.0 billion gallons. By 2005
crude oil was more than $40/bbl., on its way to a monthly
average peak around $130 in July 2008. In addition, in
2005 energy legislation (U.S. Congress, 2005) eﬀectively
promoted greater use of ethanol as an additive because oil
companies did not receive immunity from prosecution for
using MTBE, a known toxic chemical that was found
leaking into ground water supplies in several states. 
e same legislation also created the first Renewable Fuel
Standard (RFS). However, the combination of higher oil
prices and a subsidy calibrated to render ethanol profitable
at $20 oil had already ramped production beyond the
minimum levels of the first RFS. Until 2008, the key policy
instrument for biofuels was the subsidy, which at the time
was 51ﾢ per gallon of ethanol.
e subsidy and increasing crude oil prices established a
strong link between crude oil and corn prices, with a
correlation of 0.80 between 2006 and 2008 (Tyner, 2010).
Prior to 2006, the correlation between both crude oil and
corn and ethanol and corn had been very low—sometimes
even negative. Between 2006 and 2008, the correlation
between crude oil and corn was strong, in part because
ethanol was needed to supply the oxygenate market. In
2008, the ethanol market changed. e oxygenate market
was becoming saturated and corn prices rose significantly,
rendering ethanol production unprofitable in many cases.
e largest firm in the industry went bankrupt, and
nationally, more than 2 billion gallons of capacity shut
down because of poor profitability.
In 2008-09 and afterward, a close relationship was
established for the first time between ethanol and corn
prices, with a correlation of 0.84. In 2008 and part of 2009,
it was due to poor profitability. Ethanol could only be
produced profitably if corn price permitted, so the two
prices moved in lock-step. Subsequently, the blend wall
became binding, keeping a strong price link between
ethanol and corn. e important point here is that there
have been two “regime” changes: first in 2006 when the
price link between crude oil and corn became strong, and
second in 2008 when the price link between corn and
ethanol became strong for entirely diﬀerent reasons.
In December 2007, the U.S. Congress passed major new
energy legislation mandating widespread improvements in
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Figure 17: Ethanol Production
Source: Renewable Fuels Association (www.ethanolrfa.org).energy eﬃciency and a new, much larger RFS, now known
as RFS2 (U.S. Congress, 2007). e RFS, depicted in
Figure 18, includes four categories of biofuels totaling 36
billion gallons of ethanol equivalent biofuel by 2022. Of
that, up to 15 billion gallons can be starch-based (mainly
corn) ethanol called conventional biofuels. e 15-billion-
gallon level in RFS2 is reached in 2015, and the industry
capacity is already about 14.5 billion gallons. e remainder
is non-corn based biofuels.
e impact of any biofuels policy changes will be determined,
in part, by what happens to crude oil and gasoline prices.
Figure 19 contains the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
2011 forecast of crude oil prices out to 2035. DOE has three
forecast cases: low, reference and high. For 2035, the low,
reference and high price forecasts (in 2009 dollars) are $50,
$125 and $200, respectively. For 2015, these forecasts are
$55, $95 and $146. Essentially, the impact of policy changes
hinges on the relationships among the prices of crude oil and
gasoline (which are highly correlated), ethanol, and corn.
Consideration needs to be given to the potential impacts of
policy changes that could be considered in the near term.
e main categories of policy changes are:
• a change in the biofuels subsidy,
• a change in the biofuels mandates, such as a temporary 
partial waiver,
• an increase in the blending limit for standard gasoline 
type fuel and the associated blend wall, or
• a change in the mandate rules that would permit corn 
ethanol to be used in the advanced biofuels category.
Under certain conditions, the administrator of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can waive or
reduce the mandate if significant economic damage is
deemed to be caused by the mandate. In 2008, Texas Gov.
Rick Perry requested EPA reduce or waive the mandate
because of the damage being done to the livestock industry
by high corn prices. EPA declined to issue a waiver. For the
mandate to be credible, EPA would need strong justification
for waiving or reducing the mandate. Even if the mandate
were waived, with more than 14 billion gallons of capacity
already in place, it is not clear that production would fall
much as long as firms could cover variable costs of
production. at could be the case as long as oil prices
remain high. If the mandate were waived and oil prices 
fell significantly, there could be a drop in corn ethanol
production. e more likely scenario, however, is continued
high oil prices, so even waiving the mandate would not
likely have much short-run impact.
EPA has approved increasing the standard blend level to
15% for autos built since 2001, but not for older vehicles,
motorcycles and small engines. Since the 2001 and newer
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Figure 18: Biofuels Renewable Fuel Standard
Source: Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, U.S. Congress.vehicles constitute about 62% of the vehicle fleet, it is not
certain that station owners would make the switch to E15
even if final approvals are granted. For now, the E10 limit
remains in force. Given the much higher level of the
mandate, the RFS2 has become a much more important
policy instrument than the subsidy. With the blend wall, it
is likely that only a small portion of the subsidy gets passed
on to ethanol producers, so the remaining major current
driver of biofuels policy is the RFS2. is is significantly
diﬀerent from the situation in 2008 and earlier.
Multiple changes in biofuels subsidies are now being
considered. But as long as the blend wall remains binding,
what happens to subsidy policy does not matter much for
the ethanol market, since most of the subsidy under a
binding blend wall goes to consumers and blenders. If the
eﬀective blend limit is increased, the subsidy policy and
subsidy mechanisms become more important. If the blend
limit is increased, the RFS2 for corn ethanol becomes an
important factor. Here are four expected impacts of some
possible combinations of policies and prices:
• With the blending limit relaxed and the subsidy continued:
oUnder high oil prices, the subsidy could pull 
ethanol production beyond the RFS2 level, 
depending on relative corn and gasoline prices.
oUnder low oil prices and high corn prices, the 
subsidy would increase the amount of ethanol that 
could be produced and thus continue pressure on 
corn prices.
• With the blend wall in eﬀect:
oe subsidy has little impact unless the point is 
reached where plants start to shut down because of 
an inability to cover variable cost. If that occurs 
and production falls below the blend wall, the 
subsidy comes back into play.
oe only way the RFS could be met under the 
blend wall is if E85 consumption is significantly 
expanded. at would require large infrastructure 
investments and probably cross-subsidization to 
make the E85 more price-competitive for consumers.
• With a waiver of the RFS2 quantity:
oIf oil prices remain high such that the existing 
capacity continues to cover variable cost, plants 
would continue to produce, so the waiver would 
have little impact.
oIf oil prices were low such that plants could not 
cover variable cost, the waiver would result in 
plants shutting down, at least temporarily. 
e waiver would mean the RFS market guarantee 
was temporarily removed.
• Change in RFS2 to permit corn ethanol to count as an 
advanced biofuel: is is not possible under current 
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Figure 19: 2011 DOE Crude Oil Price Forecast (2009 $/bbl)
Source: U.S. Department of Energylegislation. If the legislation were changed, eﬀectively 
increasing the corn ethanol RFS, the demand for corn 
and its price would increase accordingly. is option 
has been suggested by some in the ethanol industry.
Clearly, there is a high degree of uncertainty in terms of
market conditions and government policy. e impacts of
any policy changes would be conditioned by the prevailing
market conditions.
To what extent have the government policy objectives
described at the beginning of this section been achieved?
Clearly, income for crop farmers has increased. 
However, livestock farmers have been adversely aﬀected. 
e environmental benefits from corn ethanol are likely
positive, but not as large as originally hoped (EPA, 2010).
Energy security is somewhat enhanced with ethanol,
amounting to about a half million barrels per day of
gasoline-equivalent fuel. Total U.S. oil consumption is
about 19 million barrels per day, and globally, 89 million.
To put the ethanol number in perspective, the Libya conflict
has pulled a bit more than one million barrels per day oﬀ
the market. In addition, there have been perhaps unintended
consequences of significantly higher corn prices due, in part,
to biofuels. Given that higher farm income was one of the
original objectives, certainly higher corn prices were part of
that objective. But one cannot argue that $7/bushel corn
was envisioned when the move down the biofuels pathway
began. e total impacts of the inelasticity of corn demand
introduced by the fixed mandate were not adequately
anticipated either in terms of price level or price variability.
Cellulosic Biofuels
As is clear from Figure 18, the biofuels mandates in the
RFS2 encompass cellulosic biofuels, other advanced biofuels
and biodiesel. e cellulosic biofuels component alone is 16
billion gallons of ethanol equivalent by 2022. With no
commercial cellulosic biofuels plants in the United States
today, EPA has been forced to waive most of the cellulosic
biofuels mandates for 2010 and 2011, and will need to do
the same for 2012. ere are no commercial plants today
because none of the cellulosic conversion processes are
economically competitive with gasoline and diesel. e only
guarantee of a market for the product is the RFS2, and
investors are reluctant to commit the hundreds of millions
of dollars that would be needed under that condition.
What would be the impact on food prices if a successful
cellulosic biofuels industry were developed? e argument
has been that cellulosic biofuels do not compete with
food/feed, but that is not completely true. e limiting
factor is land. Cellulosic biofuels can come from crop and
forest residues or from dedicated energy crops. Land use
would not be significantly impacted by use of residues.
Residues might be available to fulfill half of the RFS2
mandate, but dedicated energy crops would be needed for
the rest. Dedicated energy crops would require land that
today is largely cropland pasture, pasture or used to cultivate
hay. In other words, there would be some competition via
the livestock sector. We have already seen higher prices for
pasture land and forage crops. At this point, good estimates
are not available on the extent to which this competition
might lead to higher livestock prices.
World Biofuels Policies
e United States is not the only country that has
established policies to promote biofuels. e European
Union (EU) has a goal of 10% renewable automotive fuels
by 2020. e U.S. volumetric mandate is roughly 14% by
2022. Hertel et al. (2010) evaluated the impacts of U.S. 
and EU biofuels policies separately and in combination,
concluding that the impacts of both areas implementing
policies are greater than the sum of each acting alone. 
is conclusion makes sense, in that larger biofuels
demands push on a limited land supply. As more and more
land is needed, the productivity of land to be converted to
biofuels crops is lower, and consequently, more land is
needed. In other words, the global land supply system is
non-linear with high quality land being taken first, and
lower quality land being used as demand increases. Other
countries have advanced biofuels policies, as well, notably
Brazil with its large ethanol program. Clearly, the impacts of
all the global biofuels programs taken together could be
quite significant.
U.S. Agricultural Policy
Is this a new era that has changed the environment for
establishing U.S. food and agricultural policy from one of
relative abundance to one of shortages? How might policy
diﬀer in a period of shortage?
Policy of Abundance
U.S. agricultural policy has primarily been a policy of
abundance. e United States has generally been blessed
with the ability to produce more than could be consumed 
at profitable prices for producers. ere have been a few
periods in the past 100 years when the growth of demand
outpaced production and short periods of shortage ensued.
ose include World War I, when European food
production was limited; again in World War II; the 1970s,
when Soviet Union demand surged and U.S. monetary
policy sharply devalued the dollar; and the current period
when biofuels, population, world income and monetary
policy are once again driving demand.
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abundant food at low prices but with generally low farm
incomes and considerable instability in prices and farm
incomes. Policies of abundance were designed to reduce
supply, increase demand and thereby increase and stabilize
farm incomes. Supply reduction was the objective of land
set-aside programs, and partially of programs such as the
Soil Bank, and the current Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP). Supply reduction motives have always been mixed
with conservation objectives to gain political support.
Clearly these programs did/do have multiple objectives.
Demand stimulation programs have been numerous: Food
for Peace; school lunch programs; food stamps (SNAP);
export subsidies; export promotion; and biofuels mandates
and subsidies.
Periods of abundance have been characterized by low
agricultural prices and low farm incomes. Since the 1950s,
the federal government has used agricultural policy to
increasingly provided income support during periods of
abundance. Figure 20 shows the general uptrend in
government payments as a percent of U.S. farm income.
During periods of surplus production, the government’s role
has often reached 20% to 45% of sector income. ese
periods include most of the 1960s and early 1970s, and
1983-2006. e exceptions are periods of shortage in 1973-
1981, the mid-1990s when Asian demand was growing
prior to the Asian financial crisis in 1997, and the current
time period. U.S. policy today was primarily developed
during a period of abundance and therefore may be
misaligned in the current period of shortage.
Policy of Shortages 
Policies of shortage would emphasize programs that
stimulate supply and do not subsidize demand with
taxpayer funds or political mandates. U.S. experiences with
policies of shortage are limited, and the current high degree
of inelasticity complicates the issue even more. Wage and
price controls were used in World War II and U.S. farmers
were given military deferral because of the strategic need to
keep food production at high levels. In 1973 to 1975, the
land accumulated in the Soil Bank was released and
returned to crop production. In 1973, U.S. soybean exports
were embargoed for a short period due to insuﬃcient stocks.
A grain export embargo was used again in 1980 as a political
tool to punish the Soviet Union for intrusion into Afghanistan.
Today, a shift to policies of shortage would focus on supply
and demand components, as well. e role of the 31.2
million acres of land in the CRP could be a central focus on
the subject of available land area. e size of that reserve
would be a critical focus. A more flexible policy toward
haying and grazing of the land that stays in the reserve
would be helpful. Clearly, yield technology has and will
29
Figure 20: Direct U.S. Government Payments as % of Net Farm Income
Source: ERS, USDA, Farm Income Data Filescontinue to be the primary way to enhance supply over
time. Research and education are the primary vectors to
promote improved yields, and that requires increased
investments in agricultural research.
An examination of demand stimulation programs would be
important in a policy of shortage. Biofuels mandates and
subsidies, export subsidies and food consumption subsidies
all would be considered.
Setting Priorities
Policymakers could define guidelines as to which end users
had priorities when agricultural products were in short
supply. In essence current biofuels mandates give priority to
the use of grains and oilseeds for fuel over other uses.
Highly volatile prices are then the allocating mechanism for
short supplies among non-fuel users in a very inelastic
world. One clear goal of policy could be to seek ways to
increase adjustment flexibility during supply shocks.
ere are always multiple objectives in policy. In surplus
production periods, it is politically valuable to strive for any
objective that has positive benefits to someone. In periods of
shortage, there should be processes for deciding which of
the multiple objectives have priorities, or leave those
decisions to the marketplace. Agricultural and food policy
has had many objectives, and policy of shortages could
encourage policymakers to prioritize those objectives.
e history lessons of the last 100 years suggest that periods
of shortage are short-lived, and have subsequently been
followed by long periods of surplus. No one can answer
whether the current period is truly a new era, but clearly
some aspects of the current shortages are driven by public
policies of countries worldwide. 
Trade Policy
Trade policy is both a means by which countries cope with
high and volatile international commodity prices and a
reason why those world prices are so volatile. e more
countries have isolated themselves from world markets to
stabilize their own domestic markets, the more unstable the
world market (Bale and Lutz, 1979; Tyers and Anderson,
1992). Trade policy responses to stabilize domestic markets
help to explain some of the more diﬃcult issues, and possibly
incorrect explanations of the 2007-08 world price increases. 
While new trade policy changes, such as renewed export
restrictions, may not be contributing significantly to the
current increases in world prices, concern with price
volatility and debate on stabilization strategies is prominent
in international policy debate, and is part of France’s current
G20 initiatives. A consortium of international
organizations, including UN agencies and the OECD, are
now proposing reopening the WTO agenda to include
disciplines on agricultural export restrictions and measures
to enhance world food security. Proposals to stabilize global
markets are emanating from the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI), G20 discussions, and France.
Many authors and institutions (International Policy
Council, IFPRI, World Bank, OECD, FAO) also
recommend more open and transparent trade regimes as a
response to recent food crises. But many countries seem to
be ignoring that advice.
Domestic Stabilization
One strong rationale behind stockholding and self-suﬃcient
trade policy regimes is the desire for stable domestic
markets. Countries like China, India and other Asian
countries pursue this goal diligently in food markets, while
relaxing it to an extent in feed or other markets. Many
countries have exhibited a preference for stable food
markets. Recent trade policy debates have addressed this
tradeoﬀ, considering both domestic stabilization strategies
of individual countries and strategies to stabilize global
markets (see Abbott, 2010 for a review). Concerns with the
domestic stabilization approach arise because of the spillovers
to international trade, and because policies are likely to be
very costly, especially if they involve substantial stockholding.
Prior to the 2007-08 world food crisis it was believed that
instability in many countries was, to a greater extent, the
consequence of domestic events, like production shortfalls,
than variation in border prices (World Bank, 2005). A liberal
trade regime and an open border would therefore result in a
more stable domestic market. But countries that had opened
borders prior to 2007 and relied on trade for food supplies
faced high domestic prices and high import bills.
From a short-run perspective, the events of 2007-08 look
like a dramatic change in the distribution of world prices,
and price variability relative to domestic production. 
Many have asserted that grain markets are now more
volatile. A longer-term view is that world agricultural prices
have exhibited short spikes after long periods of relatively
low and stable prices. e current period diﬀers somewhat
in that events are related to and may be a continuation of
the demand shifts that precipitated the 2007-08 crisis.
Intelligent decisions on how to use trade policy, if a national
government desires some degree of domestic price stability,
require a better understanding of what the world price
distribution will look like in the future. In the absence of
that understanding, it is not surprising that some countries,
seeking a strong degree of stability, wish to pursue simple
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greater extent in the future. But if the large food producing
countries continue to do so, the international market will
remain very unstable.
WTO Commitments
One hope for ongoing (and past) WTO negotiations, and
the inclusion of agriculture since the Uruguay round of
negotiations began in 1986, was that trade liberalization
would lead to more stable international agricultural
markets. But the events of 2007-08 suggest that WTO
disciples had accomplished little to help bring that outcome.
Neither the export restrictions nor the tariﬀ cuts that
countries used to isolate domestic markets then were in
violation of WTO commitments. e WTO has focused on
market access in a world of surplus production—not on
trade policy changes when worldwide shortages may be
evident. Limiting exports taxes was discussed as the agenda
for the Doha round of negotiations began, since the EU had
imposed export taxes in the mid-1990s when world prices
increased. But that topic fell oﬀ the agenda.
WTO tariﬀ bindings are maximums, so countries are free to
reduce tariﬀs below their commitments, as many countries
have recently done. ere are calls now for more free and
open trade, as well as for further tariﬀ cuts by importers (eg.
IFPRI, IPC). at is driven by the fear that tariﬀs will be
restored to high levels, should low world prices and
surpluses re-emerge, and the hope that freer trade would
lead to more stable world markets. However, current
disciplines allow countries to vary tariﬀs in a way that
mimics a variable levy and stabilizes import access.
Export Restrictions
Disciplines on export restrictions are among the most
prominent policy proposals to cope with international price
volatility. Export quotas that permit something like normal
exports, but isolate domestic prices from world prices, have
been proposed as a better alternative than the simpler bans
on exports that were commonplace in 2008. Getting export
policy back on the WTO Doha round agenda may be
timely, but complicates negotiations that are not now
promising. ere needs to be fairness in the limitations
imposed on the use of trade policies to stabilize—proposals
that limit only some countries’ stabilization tools while
leaving unaﬀected policies of others are unlikely to be
accepted in international agreements.
International Stabilization
For world markets to become more stable, and for trade
liberalization to contribute to that stability, large traders and
large, self-suﬃcient producing countries all need to follow
more liberal, open trade regimes. Importers, as well as
exporters, need to participate in the liberalization. 
It remains an open question whether a liberalized world
market in food grains would bring about a suﬃcient degree
of stability to satisfy a country such as China, which now
permits little variation in its domestic rice and wheat prices.
As an alternative to each country pursuing its own beggar-
thy-neighbor stabilization strategy, strategies to stabilize
international markets have been proposed. In a recent policy
brief, IFPRI calls for an international grain reserve scheme
(Fan, Torero and Headey, 2011). Some have argued that the
instability in world markets represents a bubble
disconnected from fundamentals. ey propose “virtual
reserve schemes” where financial, not physical interventions,
are used to stabilize markets (von Braun and Torero, 2009).
In the early 1990s, the work on grain stockpiling began to
consider financial alternatives because the expected
distribution of world prices could mean stocks would be
held for a long time at high cost. at issue persists, with
greater uncertainty now as to the future distribution of
world prices. Better understanding of the causes of price
increases in 2007-08 and now will lead to better assessments
of the strategies that might stabilize international or
domestic markets. But if surpluses re-emerge, stockpiling for
an international reserve could be a very expensive option.
Experts in futures markets and stockpiling (Irwin and
Sanders, 2011; Wright, 2011) question the bubble
hypothesis and doubt that a financial intervention that does
not influence the quantity of grain available in world
markets could stabilize world prices. Work in the early
1990s on international market stabilization concluded that
such eﬀorts were likely to be costly, and would follow the
fate of failed international commodity agreements that had
been unable to eﬀectively stabilize markets before that time.
ose failures were attributed to both costly stocks
accumulation and the political diﬃculty of coming to a
political consensus among countries with divergent interests
(Gilbert, 1996).
Current trade policy regimes have and continue to
contribute to world price volatility. e extremes resulting
from export restrictions are not evident now, but inelastic
world markets persist because of the desire for stable
domestic markets in many countries. While international
cooperation may promise more stable world markets and
less world price volatility, widespread cooperation is needed
for that to be achieved.
Development Assistance and Self-Sufficiency
As a strategy complementary to stabilization, many
countries are now seeking a greater degree of self-suﬃciency,
and are less willing to rely on trade for their food supplies.
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development. Foreign assistance to agriculture has been in
decline since the early 1990s, however, and public investments
in agricultural research have also diminished. Moreover, the
policy responses of many countries that isolated their
domestic markets from world price increases also prevented
incentives to expand production from reaching farmers.
e UN High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security
Crisis (UNHLTF, 2008) proposed a two-pronged approach
to address food security issues in developing countries,
issues exacerbated by the 2006-08 food crisis. One prong
was to establish or shore up safety nets for the poor. 
is was met, in part, by providing additional funding 
to the World Food Program, and insuring that food aid
increased at this time of greater need but higher costs. 
But development practitioners preferred conditional cash
transfers that were ramped up in a few cases (Wodon and
Zaman, 2009). e second prong was assistance to
agricultural development. At the 2008 G20 meeting in Italy,
an additional $20 billion was promised. While significant
new initiatives have been launched, including the USAID
Feed the Future program, new funding to agricultural
development has been well below the $20 billion goal.
One reason why foreign assistance to agriculture had fallen
was that many earlier agricultural development projects had
not succeeded, and donors have been skeptical of the
eﬀectiveness of available options. e World Bank (2007),
through its World Development Report published in 2007,
had launched an eﬀort to increase attention to agricultural
development before the food crisis was apparent. at report
explains why agricultural development matters, and what lessons
may be learned from past experience. Other initiatives focusing
on African agriculture have also begun as ways to foster both
economic growth and poverty reduction on that continent.
Science exists or can be mobilized to foster more rapid
agricultural development, and while economic issues must
be faced, that has happened in some places. Foreign
assistance, or at least increased financing, is required to
realize this objective. As noted above, policy goals of
developing-country national governments did not always
align with donors and international institutions—priority
has not been given to agriculture and rural poverty. Political
obstacles must be overcome, and commitments of national
governments are required, for greater food security in a
world of higher agricultural prices to be achieved.
Based on policy responses to the food crisis, goals of
developing country governments and international donor
initiatives appear to be at odds (Abbott, 2009).
International donors would focus new programs squarely 
on poverty reduction. In their trade policy responses, and in
their requests to donors, national governments addressed
concerns of urban consumers as much as the poor, and
asked for budget support to relieve the financial costs of
actions taken. Where governments were able to use tariﬀ
cuts to hold back food price increases, tariﬀ revenue was
diminished. One of the biggest demands on the World
Bank’s response to the 2006-08 food crisis, the Global Food
Crisis Response Program, were requests by governments to
restore “fiscal space” via budget support. Another downside
to preventing high domestic prices is that incentives for a
supply response by farmers are diminished. Imperfect
integration and policy responses meant most of the strong
agricultural supply response that followed the 2006-08 crisis
occurred in the large, more developed exporting countries.
Summary
Agricultural prices and other commodity prices have
increased again in 2011. Is this a rerun of the 2008 price
spikes, or are the underlying drivers and mechanisms
diﬀerent this time around? Basically, it is both—some of the
drivers are similar to 2008, but others are quite diﬀerent.
Five key issues are important elements of the agricultural
commodity price story: 1) two big, persistent demand
shocks 2) greater market inelasticity 3) weather and stocks;
4) Chinese policy; and 5) macroeconomic factors. Key
lessons behind current commodity market events cut across
these issues.
Issue 1: Persistent Demand Shocks: 
Biofuels and Chinese Soybeans 
For 2011, the two big, persistent demand shocks driving
agricultural commodity markets are biofuels policies and
demand, and Chinese soybean imports. In the United
States, the simplest way to express these drivers is to
measure the change in acreage required to satisfy biofuels
production and U.S. exports of soybeans to China. In 2005,
16.1 million acres were required to satisfy these two
demands in the United States. In 2010, it took 46.5 million
acres to satisfy these two demands, an increase of 189% in
five years. While weather events, such as drought in Russia,
are more significant now than in 2008, accumulated stocks
have buﬀered the eﬀects on world prices. e demand
shocks on corn and soybean markets, which have persisted
since the 2006-08 crisis and have not yet been met by
suﬃcient production and stocks increases, leave those
markets vulnerable to smaller supply shocks. Satisfying these
two persistent demands has had repercussions throughout
the agricultural supply and demand systems.
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One of the key mechanisms behind what is happening in
agricultural commodity markets today is a reduction in
elasticity, or price responsiveness, of demand and supply.
e main sources of this inelasticity are:
• Tightness of land supply and more limited 
reallocation possibilities,
• Biofuels policy constraints,
• Higher livestock prices contributing to persistent 
feed demands,
• Depleted stocks and futures price incentives to store, and
• Trade policies that isolate national markets
ese factors together today result in markets with much
less capability to adjust demand or supply to higher prices
than in normal times. All five of these drivers result in
agricultural commodity markets that are much more inelastic
than normal. e consequences of the combination of all of
these mechanisms taken together are greater than the simple
impact of each in isolation. is increased inelasticity explains
much of the current higher price levels and short-term
volatility of prices, both upward and potentially downward.
Land Supply More Inelastic: Land has become an increasingly
limited resource in 2011 compared to 2008. e world has
responded to new demands by bringing more land into
production, and by shifting area from lower-demand growth
crops to higher-demand growth crops. Greater demand for
land has also brought increases in land prices and rents. e
seven major crops that had increases in worldwide area in
the past five years totaled 38 million hectares, with corn,
soybeans and rapeseed accounting for more than 30 million
hectares. Of that acreage, 27 million new hectares came into
production and 11 million hectares shifted out of lower-
demand crops. us, for the world, the flexibility to expand
area for high-demand crops was composed of about 70%
new area, with 30% by displacing alternative crops. e
total land base five years ago was about 870 million
hectares, so this change represents a 3% area increase in five
years, faster than the increase in area in the previous decade.
For the world, new acres were a more important source of
area expansion. In the United States, land area was fairly
stable, thus it was primarily shifting of crops from lower
demand to higher demand uses. It is important to note that
the three largest area increases for corn, soybeans, and
rapeseed are tightly linked to the two big drivers—biofuels
and Chinese soybean imports.
Biofuels Policy and Demand: Biofuels policy today is driven
largely by the RFS2, which is essentially a fixed mandate for
ethanol production that grows to 15 billion gallons of corn
ethanol in 2015. With the amount of mandated ethanol
today taking up around 27% of the corn crop (net of the
by-product credit), there is little doubt that biofuels play a
role in the corn price level and variability, and this has
spilled over into other commodity markets. e RFS2 has
been important in establishing ethanol production capacity
and the minimum biofuels demand for corn realized today.
e other big driver in the U.S. biofuels arena is the blend
wall, which derives from the fact that under restrictions set
by the EPA, U.S. ethanol is currently blended at either E10
or E85, with the vast majority being E10. is limits the
maximum amount of ethanol that can substitute for
gasoline. In the corn ethanol industry, the blend wall and
the RFS2 constrain ethanol production at about the same
level—12.6 billion gallons. Actual production in 2010 was
13 billion gallons, but 350 million gallons were exported.
e exports were made possible by the high world sugar price,
which led Brazil to produce more sugar and less ethanol.
e ethanol demand for corn is essentially fixed by these
two policy-determined constraints, which requires all the
other demands and supplies for corn to do the adjusting.
Persistent Feed Demands for Livestock: When there is a surge
in animal feed prices, as experienced in 2008 and again in
2011, it takes time for the livestock sectors to adjust. 
at adjustment period varies by livestock type, with
poultry typically being first and beef last. e adjustments
occur through reduction in herd size, which reduces output
which, in turn, increases product prices. For example retail
pork prices have increased 14% since 2008 and beef prices
11%. Now that the livestock product prices have made the
adjustment to higher commodity prices, producers can
better weather the current commodity price increases. 
at means less livestock production capacity adjustment
would be expected now, and therefore, more inelastic
demand for animal feed components, such as corn and
soybeans. Prices for forage crops also have increased, 
which has implications for second generation biofuels.
Grain Stocks and Futures Prices: When stocks are abundant,
much of the adjustment to supply or demand shocks is
through changes in expected carry-out stocks. Once stocks
are expected to be depleted, they can no longer adjust, 
and carry-out stocks demand becomes very inelastic. 
e diﬀerence between nearby and distant futures prices
creates incentives to increase or deplete stocks depending 
on the sign. When distant futures prices are above nearby
prices, as is the case for wheat, rice and soybeans now, 
there are disincentives to drawing stocks down further.
Tight stocks make for less elastic markets, helping to 
explain spikes in prices.
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increased in 2007 and 2008, countries altered trade policies
to isolate their domestic markets from eﬀects of those high
prices, and so partially stabilize their domestic markets. 
e most egregious measures, and most significant as a
factor behind world price spikes, were export restrictions,
especially for rice. Importers cut tariﬀs and taxes, drew from
stocks, and even subsidized imports and consumption to
isolate domestic markets from world prices. e collective
action of many importers to stabilize, and not to bear some
of the adjustment burden required in world markets, surely
contributed to the inelasticity of those markets and so to the
very high prices realized. 
Trade policy responses are believed to be less important in
the current period of rising international agricultural
commodity prices than was the case in 2007-08. While
some of the extreme trade policy measures have not yet been
repeated in the current agricultural price run-up, these
motivations behind trade policy mean international
agricultural markets remain thin and volatile.
Issue 3: Weather and Stocks
A key factor often influencing price surges is low stocks-to-
use ratios. Falling stocks-to-use ratios reflect consumption
gains relative to production and/or added stock holding. 
As indicated in Table 5, 2011 is no exception. China and
world less China matter because China often is a very large
stock holder, and changes in Chinese stock holding and trade
policy can have a significant impact on world markets. Table 5
shows United States, world, and world less China 2010-11
stock levels in percent of use and provides a qualitative
assessment of what this means for world and U.S. markets.
Clearly, the stocks-to-use ratios vary significantly among the
commodities. Corn has the tightest stocks, followed by
cotton and soybeans, particularly in the United States.
Wheat and rice have normal to somewhat above normal
stocks-to-use ratios. For that reason, wheat and rice prices
have not reached the 2008 peaks despite production
problems for wheat. Since 2008, there was enough wheat
stock building to buﬀer the 2010 production shortfalls.
Issue 4: Chinese Policy
As indicated above, China has been a major stockholder of
agricultural commodities, but the stocks-to-use ratio has
varied considerably over the past decade for each
commodity. Changes in stocks have had a major impact on
world markets in cases where trade policy was relatively
open (soybeans and corn in the early 2000s), but not where
self-suﬃciency has been extreme (wheat, rice and possibly
corn now). Here are some of these changes by commodity:
• Corn: In 2000-01, China had a stocks-to-use ratio of 
80%, but followed a destocking policy through 
2006-07, leaving it with a stocks-to-use ratio of 24% in 
that year. Especially since 2008, China has accumulated 
stocks to reach 31%, at a time when U.S. and world 
stocks are very low.
• Wheat: China followed a similar pattern in wheat, 
beginning with a stocks-to-use ratio of 83%, dropping 
to 33% in 2006-07, and increasing back to 54% in 
2010-11, in spite of world production shortfalls.
• Rice: Stocks-to-use ratios equaled 68% in 2000, but fell 
through 2004. ere has not been as much change in 
rice since, with stocks-to-use ratios around 30% for the 
past seven years.
• Soybeans: For the 2000-01 to 2005-06 period, stocks-
to-use varied from 6% to 18%, with no particular 
trend. However, from 2006-07 to 2010-11, the stocks-
to-use ratio went from 4% to 23%. is radical shift in 
stocks accounts for much of the U.S. soybean area 
being needed to satisfy Chinese imports.
• Cotton: ere is no particular pattern for cotton except 
that for 2010-11, stocks are considerably lower now, as 
they are for most regions.
e major impacts of these stocks changes are three-fold: 
1) In the five years of 2001-2005, China was destocking
corn, rice and wheat. is destocking policy led to Chinese
exports for corn, which oﬀset production-consumption
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Source: Table 3 with authors' interpretationimbalances elsewhere, but not for wheat or rice. 
2) e substantial Chinese soybean stocks accumulation 
in the past four years had a very large impact on world
markets, as the stock accumulation was accomplished
mainly through imports. 3) Recent Chinese stocks
accumulation in wheat and corn has been a product of
domestic production exceeding consumption and has 
had little impact on world markets.
Issue 5: Macroeconomics
e dollar exchange rate weakened dramatically from 2002
to 2008, contributing to a commodity boom that was also
influenced by worldwide monetary policy and inflationary
expectations. While changes are not so dramatic in 2011,
the dollar exchange rate remains quite weak and volatile.
Another commodity boom appears to have begun in June
2009, with agricultural prices once again lagging. 
e exchange rate is also correlated with other
macroeconomic factors, including worldwide economic
growth, that influence the expected high level of 
agricultural commodity prices.
Implications for the Future
Biofuels and Chinese Soybean Import 
Demand Revisited
For biofuels, the United States produced 13 billion gallons
of ethanol in 2010 and has capacity today exceeding 
14 billion gallons. e portion of the RFS2 which can be
met by corn starch is 15 billion gallons by 2015. In other
words, the mandated level has essentially been reached, 
and the growth rate will be quite slow moving forward.
From this point forward, normal trend yield increases will
satisfy the future increases in corn-based-ethanol demand.
However, the demand levels will remain high.
For Chinese soybean imports, the story is similar. Table 2
shows that Chinese soybean stocks have now reached 23%
of use, the highest level of the past decade. China will not
continue to build stocks much beyond this level. China will
continue to import large amounts of soybeans, but it will 
be to fill the domestic gap between consumption and
production, not to further accumulate stocks.
Both of the key drivers responsible for creating today’s
situation will be less important in the future. e level and
percentage of corn use for ethanol will remain high, but
growth will be quite low. With the reduced growth rate in
these demands, it will be easier for global production to
catch up with demand. It is expected it will take two years
to increase stocks to more adequate levels, but it is not
anticipated that prices will remain at recent levels unless
there are serious weather and yield problems.
Not Likely to Restore World Supply in 2011-12
Much is riding on 2011-12 corn and soybean production. 
A return to normal yields barely allows the world to
continue to meet trend consumption. Yield uncertainty
means there may be wide swings in prices. Yields below
trend imply a need to ration short supplies, with prices
potentially even higher than those of the first-half of 2011.
Yields above trend could mean some moderation in prices,
but not nearly as large as was experienced in late 2008 and
2009 with worldwide recession.
In the absence of yields well above trend, it appears the 
tight world stocks situation for corn and soybeans cannot 
be overcome in one crop year and that high prices will exist
for two crop years or longer. In essence, high prices, at least 
by historical standards, appear to be the new norm.
Meanwhile, the world is walking close to the edge of food
insecurity, with the potential for extraordinarily high prices
in any year of major production setbacks.
If 2011 yields are below trend yields, the impact would vary
by crop. If there were sub-trend corn yields, for example,
much higher prices would be expected and there would be a
need to ration the already tight supply. e same essentially
would be true for cotton. For the other crops, the impacts
might be smaller, but still could be significant.
Longer-Term: Can Supply Catch Up
Historically, short periods of demand surge, or of
production shortfalls when stocks were low, have sharply
increased prices, leading to a supply response that brings
more land into cultivation. If demand did not persist, this
supply response has typically led to longer periods of lower
prices and a boom/bust cycle. is time the two demand
surges are likely to persist, but their rate of growth is likely
to slow. is slowing of demand growth will give world
supply growth an opportunity to catch up in coming years.
Prices would then moderate from current high levels and a
bust phase might be avoided. at of course will depend on
other factors as well such as new demand growth, the extent
of supply response, and world macroeconomic events. 
While there are many challenges, there are opportunities as
well. To the extent prices are higher in the long-run, farmers
globally will have reason to increase acreage and production,
ultimately moderating high prices. At present there are
many regions of the world with cereal yields less than half
those in the United States but with adequate soils and
available rainfall. Higher corn prices could encourage
farmers in these areas to make technical changes—improved
seed varieties, more fertilizer, that would help close the yield
gap to some extent. In fact, this outcome could be quite
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poor farmers. However, many technical, economic and




e United States uses both subsidies and mandates at
present to encourage biofuels production, but the RFS2
mandate is currently more important than the subsidy. 
If subsidies are reduced or eliminated, or the mandate is
changed, changing policies would have little near-term
impact under most circumstances. Most of the subsidy does
not now reach the ethanol producer, so reducing it has 
little impact on corn demand under most circumstances.
Reducing the RFS2 would not have much impact as long 
as oil prices remain high because the production capacity
already exists. e blend wall now constrains the impact of
high oil prices on corn. Relaxing blending restrictions could
lead to further increases in biofuels demand for corn. 
Under a lower oil price regime, the impacts of subsidy 
and RFS changes would be significant.
U.S. Agricultural Policy
U.S. agricultural policy has primarily been a policy of
abundance, because the United States has generally been
blessed with the ability to produce more than could be
consumed at profitable prices for producers. Policies of
abundance were designed to reduce supply, restrict land 
use, increase demand and thereby increase and stabilize 
farm incomes.
A shift to a policy of shortage would do the opposite, with
an emphasis on programs that stimulate supply and do not
subsidize demand with taxpayer funds or political mandates.
Experiences with policies of shortage are more limited, and
certainly the greater inelasticity limits degrees of freedom in
that policy domain. Today, a shift to policy of shortage
would focus on supply and demand management policies.
e 31.2 million acres of land in the CRP could be a central
focus on the subject of land area available for expansion.
Clearly, yield technology has and will continue to be the
primary way to enhance supply over time. Research and
education are the primary vectors to promote improved
yields. A re-examination of demand stimulation programs
would be important in a policy of shortage. Biofuels
mandates and subsidies, export subsidies, and food
consumption subsidies all would be considered.
Trade Policy
For world markets to become more stable, and for trade
liberalization to contribute to that stability, the large traders
and the large, self-suﬃcient producing countries all need to
follow more liberal, open-trade regimes. Importers as well as
exporters need to participate in that liberalization. It remains
an open question whether a liberalized world market in
food grains would bring about a suﬃcient degree of stability
to satisfy a country such as China, which now permits little
variation in its domestic rice and wheat prices.
Trade policy regimes have in the past and continue today to
contribute to world price volatility. e extremes resulting
from export restrictions in 2007-08 are not evident now,
but inelastic world markets persist because of the desire 
for stable domestic markets in many countries. 
While international cooperation may promise more stable
world markets and less world price volatility, widespread
cooperation is needed for that to be achieved.
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